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THE FOUR DOCTRINES OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 
By Carws Manuel Vazquez* 
A distinction has become entrenched in United States law between treaties that are 
"self-executing" and those that are not. The precise nature of this distinction-indeed, 
its very existence-is a matter of some controversy1 and much confusion.2 More than 
one lower federal court has pronounced the distinction to be the "most confounding" 
in the United States law of treaties.3 A tremendous amount of scholarship has sought to 
clarify this distinction,4 but the honest observer cannot but agree with John Jackson's 
observation that " [ t] he substantial volume of scholarly writing on this issue has not yet 
resolved the confusion" surrounding it.5 The continuing, and remarkably candid, judi-
cial confusion over this issue will, I hope, excuse yet another attempt to bring some 
coherence to the doctrine. In this article, I argue that much of the doctrinal disarray 
and judicial confusion is attributable to the failure of courts and commentators to 
recognize that for some time four distinct "doctrines" of self-executing treaties have 
been masquerading as one. With a view to furthering the development of doctrine in 
conformity with constitutional allocations of power, I identifY these four "doctrines," as 
reflected in the self-execution decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts, and I examine the very different types of analysis that they call for.6 
At a general level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that may be 
enforced in the courts without prior legislation by Congress, and a non-self-executing 
treaty, conversely, as a treaty that may not be enforced in the courts without prior 
legislative "implementation."' This definition helps us understand the domestic alloca-
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for comments received from 
Brice M. Clagett, Daniel Ernst, Vicki Jackson, Laura Macklin, John Noyes, Jordan Paust, Alfred Rubin and 
Barbara Stark, and for the excellent research assistance of Joseph C. Bryce. 
1 Jordan]. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AJIL 760 (1988); Yuji Iwasawa, The Dodrine of Self-Executing Treaties 
m the United States: A Cntical Analysis, 26 VA. J. lNT'L L. 627, 635 (1986). 
" .'YP Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based mghts and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1117-
23 (1992); John H. Jackson, United States, in THE EFFEcr OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 141, 148-49 (Francis 
G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987). 
'United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. 
Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The statement would be accurate even if the words "of treaties" 
were omitted. 
1 In addition to the other articles cited herein, see those cited in Jackson, supra note 2, at 149 n.26. 
·,/d. at 149. 
''This article addresses the distinction as it is drawn in United States law. Similar distinctions exist in 
international law, see Advisory Opinion No. 15, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 PCij (ser. B) No. 
15 (Mar. 3), and in the laws of other nations and regional arrangements such as the European Union. The 
distinction has proved to be controversial and confusing in these contexts, too. See, e.g., Pierre Pescatore, The 
Dortnne of "Dzred Effed": An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EuR. L. REv. 155 (1983); Josephine Steiner, 
Dmrt Applicability in EEC Law-A Chameleon Concept, 98 LAw Q. REv. 229 (1982);]. A. Winter, Dired Applicability 
and Dzred Effed: Two Distind and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 425 (1972). 
7 See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. 
L1byan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985); Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575 (4th Cir. 1983); British Caledonian Ainvays v. Bond, 
665 F.2d 1153, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Posta~ 589 F.2d at 875; Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848,850-51 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976); Bartram v. Robertson, 15 F. 212, 213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883), affd, 122 U.S. 116 (1887); Noriega, 808 
F.2d at 798; Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, 
235 RECUEIL DES COVRS 303, 317 (1992 IV). 
By "enforced in the courts," I mean enforced in our domestic courts (whether state or federal) at the 
behest of individuals. Although treaties as a matter of international law are thought to confer rights only on 
state,, domestic law regulates the legal relations of individuals vis-a-vis other individuals and government, and 
the purpose of our domestic courts has always been thought to be the vindication of the rights of individuals, 
695 
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tion-of-powers function of the distinction: it allocates between the judiciary and the 
legislature the responsibility for enforcing compliance with treaties by everyone else 
(private individuals, state and federal executive officials, state legislatures). But the doc-
trine allocates this responsibility only provisionally. Because of the last-in-time rule, under 
which a statute is to be enforced by the courts even if it conflicts with an earlier treaty,8 
the legislature ultimately has the power to control the judiciary's role in enforcing even 
self-executing treaties.9 The doctrine of self-executing treaties thus serves to distinguish 
those treaties that require an act of the legislature to authorize judicial <mforcement 
from those that require an act of the legislature to remove or modify the courts' enforce-
ment power (and duty). 
Understanding the distinction's allocation-of-powers function is crucial to understand-
ing the doctrine. It helps us frame the central question involved in any self-execution 
inquiry. The principal aim of this article, however, is to identify and classify the types of 
reasons that might legitimately lead courts to conclude that particular treaties are or are 
not judicially enforceable without additional legislation. To that end, I begin by examin-
ing the most relevant provision of the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which 
declares that "all Treaties [of the United States] shall be the supreme Law of the Land," 
and instructs the courts to give them effect. 10 As shown below, this clause was adopted 
to minimize treaty violations attributable to the United States, a goal that the Founders 
sought to advance by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at the behe:;t of affected 
individuals without awaiting authorization from state or federal legislatures. As the Su-
premacy Clause thus addresses the allocation-of-powers question posed by the "self-
executing/non-self-executing" distinction, the latter distinction is ultimately a gloss on 
that constitutional provision. This article identifies four grounds on which a court might 
legitimately conclude that legislative action is necessary to authorize it to enforce a treaty, 
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause. First, legislative action is necessary if the parties 
to the treaty (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers alone) intended that the u·eaty's object 
not sovereigns. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, 
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."). Thus, if the purpose of the Supremacy Clause (insofar as 
treaties are concerned) was to make treaties enforceable in the courts, as I show below and in Vazquez, supra 
note 2, it was perforce to make them enforceable in court at the behest of individuals. It cannot be maintained 
that the Founders contemplated that treaties would be enforced in our courts only at the behest of sovereign 
states and their officials. (For a more extended discussion of these points, see generally Vazquez, supra note 
2.) Hereinafter, any reference to the enforcement or enforceability of treaties in the courts refers to their 
enforcement or enforceability in our domestic courts (whether state or federal) at the beheH of individuals. 
The recognition that treaties are (at least sometimes) enforceable in our courts at the behest of individuals 
raises the question of which individuals may enforce them and when. I addressed these questions at some 
length in Vazquez, supra note 2, and I address them further in part V infra. 
8 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-
21 (1870). 
9 Although the last-in-time rule has been attacked as undesirable and as inconsistent with the Framers' intent 
insofar as it permits Congress to abrogate a treaty for domestic-law purposes, see Louis Henkin, Treaties itl a 
ConstitutionalDemfJcracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425-26 (1989);Jules Lobel, The Limits of Cor..stitutional Power: 
Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985), the Supreme Ceourt has adhered 
to it with notable consistency and shows no sign of rejecting it. But cJ. Jordan J. Paust, Rediswverittg the Relationship 
Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 
28 VA.J. INT'L L. 393 (1988). Because of its pedigree, and because the evidence that the rule is inconsistent 
with the Framers' intent is inconclusive (there appear to have been varying views on the point among the 
Framers), I treat the last-in-time rule as a fixed point in my analysis. See Vazquez, supra note~!. at 11I4 n.126. 
10 The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CoNsr. Art. VI, cl. 2, provides as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Lawf of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
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be accomplished through intervening acts of legislation. Second, legislative action is 
necessary if the norm the treaty establishes is "addressed" as a constitutional matter to 
the legislature. Third, legislative action is necessary if the treaty purports to accomplish 
what under our Constitution may be accomplished only by statute. Finally, legislation is 
necessary if no law confers a right of action on a plaintiff seeking to enforce the treaty. 
The proposed typology leaves enormous questions unresolved. For example, what 
types of treaty-based norms are constitutionally addressed to the legislature? What powers 
does our Constitution allocate exclusively to the lawmakers? It is not the principal pur-
pose of this article to answer these or similar questions. But any effort to bring coherence 
and analytical clarity to this area of the law must begin by asking the right questions, 
and to this end distinguishing the four doctrines of self-executing treaties is an essential 
first step. The four doctrines raise different questions and require different analyses. 
Just differentiating them would accordingly be a notable step fonvard. 
I. THE SUPREMACY ClAUSE: ITS HISTORY AND PURPOSE IN REsPECf TO TREATIES 
Since the time of our independence, treaties in Great Britain have not been thought 
to have the status of municipal law enforceable in common-law courts. This is attributable 
to allocation-of-powers concerns: treaties in Great Britain are concluded by the Crown, 
but enacting municipal laws is the province of Parliament.11 If a treaty contemplates that 
individuals will be treated in certain 'vays or their rights and liabilities governed by 
particular rules, the treaty must be "implemented" by Parliament and the required 
norms incorporated into municipal law by statute. Thereafter, the statute, but not the 
treaty itself, will be given effect by domestic law-applying officials. In other words, under 
the fundamental law of Great Britain, all treaties are "non-self-executing."12 All treaties, 
11 &e]. G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL L\w 81-82 (lOth ed. 1989);J. G. Collier, Is Intematianal 
Law &ally Part of the Law of England?, 38 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 924, 925-26 (1989) (citing The Parlement Beige, 
4 P.D. 129 (1879)). 
12 The British rule ·was described in some detail by Justice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 256, 
274-75, rev'd an other grounds, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). (Justice Iredell's decision on Circuit was reversed 
because a majority of the Court disagreed with Iredell's narrow conslruction of the treaty. The other Justices 
did not take issue with Iredell's discussion of the history or purpose of the Supremacy Clause. Justice Story 
cited Iredell's discussion of this history with approval in 3JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
or THE UNITED STATES 696 (1833).) Iredell described the British rule as follows: 
[I]t is an invariable practice in that country, when the King makes any stipulation [in a treaty] of a 
legislative nature, that it is carried into effect by an act of Parliament. The Parliament is considered as 
bound, upon a principle of moral obligation, to preserve the public faith, pledged by the treaty, by passing 
such Jaws as its obligation requires; but until such laws are passed, the system of law, entitled to actual 
obedience, remains de fado, as before. 
:~ U.S. (3 Dall.) at 274. Iredell gave the example of a treaty that purports to set a tariff at a given level. 
According to Iredell, such a treaty, despite its "self-executing" language, would not have been enforceable 
by British Jaw-applying officials until implementing legislation was enacted by Parliament. !d. at 274-75. Insofar 
a' Iredell suggested that no judges would have given effect to treaties without parliamentary implementation, 
he may have ·written too broadly, as admiralty and prize courts were empowered to give effect to the Jaw of 
nauons (including treaties) directly. See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE L<~.W OF PIRACY 66-121 (1988). Accordingly, 
Iredell should probably be understood to have been describing the allocation of treaty-enforcement authority 
as between Parliament and the common-Jaw courts. Cf. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical jurisprudence: 
Cokl', Selden, Hale, 103 ThLE LJ. 1651, 1679 (1994) (attributing to Coke the "widespread notion" that "English 
law" meant the English common Jaw and did not include the admiralty Jaw or the law merchant, which were 
considered "foreign Jaw"). 
Starke notes that there are limited exceptions to the requirement of parliamentary implementation: 
No legislation is required for certain specific classes of treaties, namely, treaties modifying the belligerent 
rights of the Crown when engaged in maritime warfare (presumably because such treaties involve no 
major inlrusion on the legislative domain of Parliament), and administrative agreements of an informal 
character needing only signature, but not ratification, provided they do not involve any alteration of 
municipal Jaw. 
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whatever their terms or ~e intent of the parties, require legislative implementation 
before they may be enforced by domestic law-applying officials. 13 
Among the pressing problems of the period of the Articles of Confedera1ion were the 
repeated violations by the states of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.14 The problem 
was aggravated by the widespread understanding during this period that the treaties 
concluded by the Continental Congress were not enforceable as law in the courts of the 
states in the face of conflicting state legislation.15 As in Great Britain, repealing acts of 
legislation were thought to be necessary, and very often the state legislatures neglected 
or refused to enact the required laws.16 Congress passed a resolution in its waning days 
proclaiming that treaties were "binding and obligatory" on the states even without 
implementing legislation, 17 but this position was controversial and, in any event, the 
federal Government lacked a mechanism for making state courts enforce 1reaties.18 
The repeated violation of treaties by the states was a prime concern of the Framers 
who gathered in Philadelphia to amend the Articles. But it was merely one facet of a 
more general problem: the Articles lacked a mechanism for enforcing any of the acts 
of the central Government, or the Articles themselves. The absence of such a mecha-
nism was a principal reason for the Framers' decision to draft a new constitution rather 
than amend the Articles. The Framers considered two alternative mechanisms. The 
Vrrginia plan would have given Congress the power to "negative" state laws that contra-
vened the Constitution, federal statutes or treaties. As applied to treati·es, this plan 
would apparently have retained the need for an act of the legislature transforming 
each treaty obligation into domestic law (although it would have empowered the federal 
legislature to act in place of the state legislatures). The New Jersey plan, on the other 
hand, included a version of the Supremacy Clause, which declared the Constitution, 
federal laws and treaties to have automatic domestic legal force and instructed the 
courts to give them effect directly. Ultimately, the Framers adopted the:· Supremacy 
Clause. The clause addressed the treaty violation problem by altering the British rule: 
STARKE, supra note 11, at 82-83. Significantly, these exceptions appear to involve matters unlikely to become 
the subject of litigation before common-law courts. 
13 The constitutional rule under which all treaties are deemed to be non-self-executing wilT. be referred to 
herein as the British rule. 
14 See 1 STORY, supra note 12, at 242-43; 3 id. at 696; W1LUAM RAWLE, A V1EWOFTI1E CONSTITUTION OF TilE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 74-75 (1829); see generally Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1101-02. 
15 See Justice Iredell's opinion in Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall. ) at 276. See also 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 696. 
16 See RAWLE, supra note 14, at 74. · 
17 32jOURNALSOFTHE CONTINENTAL CoNGRESS 124-25,177-84 (Mar. 21, 1787) (Roscoe R. Hill cd., 1936). 
The resolution declared that "on being constitutionally made[,] ratified and published [trcatjes] become in 
virtue of the confederation part of the law of the land and are not only independent of the will and power 
of [state] legislatures but also binding and obligatory on them." /d. at 124-25. Somewhat inconsistently, it 
also requested that the states enact legislation repealing laws that conflicted with treaties. /d. at 125. Iredell 
interpreted this request as recognition that Congress lacked the power to dispense with the ne(·d for repealing 
legislation. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 276. Madison in the Continental Congress explained that "a repeal 
of those contravening laws was expedient, and even necessary, to free the courts from the bia!l of their oaths, 
which bound the judges more strongly to the states than to the federal authority." jAMES MAI>ISON, DEBATES 
IN THE CONGRESS OF THE CoNFEDERATION (Mar. 21, 1787), reprinted in 5 DEBATES ON THE AnOPTlON OF TilE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 98-99 (J. Elliott n.d.) (2d ed. 1968) (hereinafter ELLIOTT'S DEBATES]. This amounts 
to a concession that despite the resolution (at least many) state courts would not regard treaties as laws binding 
on them. As both Iredell and Story observed, the Supremacy Clause was adopted to "obviate this difficulty." 
Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 277; 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 696. 
18 See Iredell's opinion in Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 277; 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 696. In the Continental 
Congress, Yates at first objected to the portion of the resolution declaring treaties to be the law of the land, 
noting that "the states, or at least his state, did not admit it to be such until clothed with a legal sanction." 
MADISON, supra note 17 (Mar. 20, 1787), reprinted in 5 ELUOTT'S DEBATES 98. On the next day, however, he 
declared himself "satisfied with the resolutions as they stood" because "the words 'constitutionally made' •.. 
qualify sufficiently the doctrine on which the resolution was founded." /d. 
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it declared treaties to be "the supreme Law of the Land" and directed the courts to 
give them effect without awaiting action by the legislatures of either the states or the 
federal Government. It effectuated a wholesale incorporation of U.S. treaties into 
domestic law, dispensing with the need for retail transformation of treaties into domes-
tic law by Congress. 19 
The history of the Supremacy Clause thus shows that its purpose was to avert violations 
of treaties attributable to the United States, and that the Founders sought to accomplish 
this goal by making treaties enforceable in the courts at the behest of affected individuals 
without the need for additional legislative action, either state or federal. 20 The clause's 
allocation-of-powers function was cogently summarized by Justice Story in his Commentar-
ies on the Constitution of the United States. Story noted the "notorious" history of "gross[] 
disregard[]" of treaties by the states, which considered treaties "not as laws, but like 
requisitions, of mere moral obligation, and dependent upon the good will of the states 
for their execution."21 Observing that the Supremacy Clause had been inserted in the 
Constitution to "obviate this difficulty,"22 Story wrote as follows: 
It is ... indispensable that [treaties] should have the obligation and force of a law, 
that they may be executed by the judicial power, and be obeyed like other laws .... 
The difference between considering them as laws, and considering them as execu-
tory, or executed contracts, is exceedingly important in the actual administration 
of public justice. If they are supreme laws, courts of justice will enforce them directly 
in all cases, to which they can be judicially applied. . .. If they are deemed but 
solemn compacts, promissory in their nature and obligation, courts of justice may 
be embarrassed in enforcing them, and may be compelled to leave the redress to 
be administered through other departments of the government.23 
The recognition that treaties, along with the Constitution and federal statutes, are 
"law" and therefore enforceable by the courts without prior legislative transformation 
into domestic law does not, of course, mean that treaties may be enforced in court by 
any individual at any time. The effect of the Supremacy Clause was to superimpose the 
,., See generaUy Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1097-1104; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The "Self-Executing" Character of 
the &JUgee Protorol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 39, 44-49 (1993). See also Paust, supra 
note I, at 760-63. 
"" Because the lower federal courts derive their jurisdiction entirely from federal statutes-because, in other 
words, the Article III jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is not "self-executing" -no treaty may be enforced 
in these courts without some authorizing legislation. The statement that the Supremacy Clause makes treaties 
enforceable in court without additional legislative authorization is therefore technically true only with respect 
to ~tate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court (whose Article III jurisdiction is self-executing). (The same may 
be said about the Constitution and statutes, for that matter.) Indeed, because state courts, too, exist and 
possess jurisdiction only pursuant to state law, it might be contended that, even here, treaties are enforceable 
in court only if supplemented by other laws. (Again, to the extent this contention is true, it applies equally 
to federal statutes and the Constitution itself.) This observation merely illustrates that no law is wholly "self-
executing." Recognizing that every law requires some legislative supplementation, in tum, means that the first 
question that must be addressed whenever a treaty (or any law) is claimed to be non-self-executing should 
be: what is it that the treaty assertedly fails to accomplish itself? (The next question should be: does some 
other law accomplish it?) As described in the text, the Supremacy Clause eliminated the need for one form 
of legislative supplementation: it dispensed with the need for legislation giving the treaty provision the force 
of domestic law and thus making the treaty cognizable by (and binding on) courts and other domestic-law-
applying officials. The Supremacy Clause (itself a law) may be said to "execute" all treaties in this respect. 
Taking the foregoing objections into account, the statement in the text may be qualified as follows: the 
Supremacy Clause makes treaties "directly" enforceable in courts that exist and possess jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, at the behest of individuals who have standing and, if necessary, a right of action. Some of 
these qualifications are discussed in the remainder of this part and in part V infra. Additional qualifications 
are no doubt necessary. 
"' 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 696. 
"" ld. 
2 
' ld. at 695. 
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nation's treaty obligations, as well as the Constitution and federal statutes, on the existing 
corpus juris of the states as supreme federal law. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 
treaties of their own force nullify inconsistent state laws and earlier federal laws, and 
the judicial mechanisms available generally to enforce laws in the United States are 
available to enforce treaties.24 The Supremacy Clause does not eliminate every possible 
obstacle a litigant relying on a treaty might face, but it does eliminate one: without the 
c~ause, the nation's treaties would merely have possessed the status of international law 
enforceable only by states and only in international fora; the Supremacy Clause gives 
treaties the character of municipal law enforceable in domestic courts at the behest of 
private individuals. 25 
II. THE "INTENT-BASED" DOCTRINE 
Foster v. Neilson and the Distindion between Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties 
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was introduced 
into U.S. jurisprudence by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson.26 Foster was an action 
in the nature of ejectment in which the plaintiffs claimed title to a tract of land in West 
Florida on the basis of a grant from Spain. The treaty by which sovereignty over the 
territory that included the disputed land was transferred to the United States27 provided, 
according to the English text, that the Spanish grants "shall be ratified and confirmed 
to the parties in possession thereof." The plaintiffs argued that their title to the property 
had been confirmed by the treaty and that the court therefore was required to recognize 
their title in the land. The Supreme Court decided that the courts could :not recognize 
the Spanish grant as valid for purposes of domestic law until Congress enacted legislation 
confirming the grants. 
The Court began its discussion of the self-execution issue by describing; the effect of 
treaties in countries that do not have a Supremacy Clause: 
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It 
does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far 
as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign 
power of the respective parties to the instrument.28 
The Court, however, went on to say: 
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a 
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of 
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without 
the aid of any legislative provision.29 
24 See generaUy infra part V. 
25 See generaUy Vazquez, supra note 2. See also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) 
("The Extradition Treaty has the force oflaw, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear 
that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of tht! practice of one 
nation to the other nation."); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). 
26 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
v The Foster self-execution holding was an alternative ground for denying relief. See infra note 35. Before 
reaching the self-execution issue, the Court held that the treaty was inapplicable because the United States 
possessed sovereignty over the relevant land at the time the treaty was concluded. Because the Court's conclu· 
sion that the treaty was not self-executing was an independent basis for denying relief, our discussion of the 
Court's self-execution holding may assume that Spain did possess sovereignty over the rcl(:vant land at the 
relevant time. 
21l 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Court thus recognized that the Supremacy Clause served to alter the British rule, 
and established the "different principle" in the United States that treaties do not gener-
ally require legislative implementation. But the Court qualified its statement about the 
Supremacy Clause's effect: it said only that treaties that "operate of themselves" are 
applicable by the courts without legislative implementation. The Court's qualification is 
the source of the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. 
Given the Court's earlier observation that, in the absence of the Supremacy Clause, 
treaties "in [their] nature" do not operate of thell}.selves as domestic law, its suggestion 
that, under the Supremacy Clause, only treaties that "operate of themselves" may be 
enforced by the courts as law is confusing. Interpreted broadly, the qualification threatens 
to resurrect the British rule, under which no treaty is "self-executing," and certain courts 
and commentators have seemingly so interpreted it. 30 But an examination of the Court's 
application of the distinction to the treaty before it in Foster and in United States v. 
Perrheman,:11 a later case involving the same treaty, shows that the category of non-self-
executing treaties that the Court carved out in those decisions was considerably narrower 
in scope. 
The Court in Foster regarded the question whether the treaty operated of itself to be 
a matter of treaty construction. The Court focused on the words of the treaty. It said 
that, if the treaty had provided that the grants were "hereby" confirmed, it would have 
served to confirm the grants.32 But it interpreted the treaty's English text (providing 
that the grants "shall be ratified and confirmed") as contemplating a future act of 
ratification by the United States. The treaty "pledged the faith of the United States to 
paS5 acts which shall ratify and confirm the grants.'m Such a provision is "executory" 
and must be "executed" by the legislature before it may be applied by the courts. In 
the Percheman case, the Court was presented with the Spanish text of the treaty, which 
was equally authoritative, and which provided that the grants "shall remain ratified and 
confirmed." The Court reversed itself and held that the treaty did "operate of itself' 
and could accordingly be applied by the courts without prior legislative action. In the 
Court's words, the Spanish text showed that the treaty did not, as it had previously held, 
"stipulate for some future legislative act."34 
The category of "non-self-executing" treaty that the Court recognized in Foster thus 
consists of treaties that do not themselves purport to affect the rights and liabilities of 
individuals before the court, but instead contemplate that those rights and liabilities will 
'"For example, Judge Bork, in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
808 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cited Foster for the proposition that "[t]reaties of the United States ... do not generally 
create rights that are privately enforceable in courts." In recent litigation, the executive branch has argued 
that this opinion and others establish a "presumption" that treaties are not self-executing. See Vazquez, supra 
note I 9, at 54 n.66 (citing government submissions taking this position). For the reasons set forth in this part, 
Foster actually establishes the opposite presumption. The lower-court decisions on which the executive branch 
has relied to support its argument that there is a presumption against judicial enforceability may be interpreted 
instead merely to be making the factual statement that most treaties are not self-executing. See, in addition 
to Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren, Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 
(1976); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, 
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). So interpreted, the statement may or may not 
be correct as an empirical matter, but it tells us nothing about how to determine whether a given treaty is or 
b not self-executing. If the lower courts did mean to suggest that there is a presumption that U.S. treaties are 
not ~elf-executing, their dicta to this effect must be rejected for the reasons set forth in this part. See also 
RE';T\TEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RElATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111 reporters' note 5 (1987) 
[hereinafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Paust, supra note 1, at 774-75. 
"32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
12 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
',,/d. (emphasis added). 
'' 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88-89. 
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be affected by future acts of domestic lawmak.ing.35 The Court's holding in Foster recog-
nizes that the general rule established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties 
are enforceable in the courts without prior legislative action, is one that may be altered 
by the parties to the treaty through the treaty itself. Treaties do not require legislative 
implementation in the United States ''by [their] nature,'' but they may require legislative 
implementation through affirmative agreement of the parties. If the parties to the treaty 
agreed that the rights and liabilities of the individuals before the court were to be 
affected only through future lawmaking acts of the states parties-if they "stipulate[d] 
for some future legislative act''-then the treaty does not ''operate of itself' and accord-
ingly cannot be enforced by the courts without prior legislation.36 Because such treaties 
35 Professor Buergenthal has argued that the decision in Foster did not in fact tum on whether the parties 
to the treaty had intended to require a future legislative act. He interprets the decision as reflecting instead 
the Court's deference to the position of the political branches that Spain had not at the relevant time possessed 
sovereignty over the disputed territory. SeeBuergenthal, supra note 7, at 374-75. This reading of Foster, however, 
fails to take account of the fact that the "self-execution" holding in Foster was one of two independent grounds 
for denying relief, and that the Court deferred to the political branches only in the portion of the opinion 
that related to the other ground. Before holding that it was not self-executing, the Court held (by a divided 
vote) that the 1819 treaty between Spain and the United States was inapplicable. By the second article of that 
treaty, Spain ceded to the United States "all the territories which belong to [it]" in West Florida, and by the 
eighth article the United States agreed (according to the English text) that "all the grants of' land made ... 
by his catholic majesty ... in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and 
confirmed." The Court in Foster concluded that the land at issue was not situated in territor:• that belonged 
to Spain in 1819, and that, accordingly, the Spanish grant did not come within the purview of Article 8. It 
was only after reaching this conclusion that the Court went on to hold that, even if the territory had belonged 
to Spain at the relevant time, Article 8 was unavailing to the plaintiffs because it was not self-executing. 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310, 314 (emphasis added). In reaching the first holding, the Court deferred to the Executive's 
construction of an 1803 treaty between France and Spain. ld. at 309. (As the Executive consuued this treaty, 
Spain had ceded the relevant land to France in 1803, and France had ceded it to the United States by treaty 
in 1804. The land was accordingly not Spain's to cede in 1819. It is noteworthy that the Court here deferred 
to the E.xecutive's construction of a treaty to which the United States was not a party, and that accordingly 
was not the "law of the land." Foster thus cannot be read as a precedent for the proposition that U.S. courts 
must defer to the Executive's construction of treaties that are the "law of the land.") The Courf s self-execution 
holding did not in any way rest on judicial deference to the Executive's interpretation of the 1819 treaty. 
Indeed, the Court did not even mention any evidence of the political branches' construction of the 1819 
treaty (aside from its text). That the political branches' position was not conclusive of the self-c!xecution issue, 
or even significant, is strongly suggested by the holding in Percheman, in which the Court rejected the justice 
Department's construction of the treaty. It is true that Percheman involved land in territory over which Spain 
had previously had undisputed sovereignty, but that fact did not play a role in the Court's self-execution 
analysis. Later, in Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838}, a case involving land in the disputed territory, 
the Court recognized that Percheman had "overruled" Foster on the self-execution issue, and it did not purport 
to disturb Percheman on that score. Instead, it reaffirmed Foster's alternative holding that Article 8 did not 
apply because the relevant land did not belong to Spain in 1819. ld. at 519-20, 522. I therefore do not 
agree with Professor Buergenthal's suggestion, Buergenthal, supra, at 375 n.209, that Garcia confirms his 
interpretation of the self-execution holdings of Foster and Percheman. 
36 If Foster and Percheman are so interpreted, they establish that under U.S. law there is a presumption that 
treaties require no legislative implementation. Admittedly, there is language in Foster that d·:>es not suggest 
such a presumption. For example, the Court said that the pertinent question in its view was: "Do [the treaty's] 
words act directly on the grants, so as to give validity to those not otherwise valid; or do they pledge the faith 
of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm them?" 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. This language 
suggests a "purer" interpretive enterprise than the one suggested in this article's interpretatiCln of Foster, one 
uninfluenced by any presumption. A "no presumption" rule, however, would be in tension with the Court's 
recognition in the same case that, (1) for nations without a supremacy clause (which at that time meant all 
nations except the United States, see infra note 43}, treaties "by [their] nature," whatever thdr words, could 
not "act directly on the grants" but instead "pledged the faith" of the parties to enact legi!:lation; and (2) 
the Supremacy Clause established a "different principle" in the United States. As I argue below, the Court 
in Foster took insufficient account of the implications of these propositions. (Moreover, because nations negoti-
ating treaties do not typically address matters of domestic enforcement, see text at and note 63 infra, the 
absence of a presumption of self-execution is, as a practical matter, tantamount to a presumption agai71St self-
execution.) The Court's about-face in Percheman should be interpreted as resolving the ambiguity of the Foster 
decision in favor of the "different principle" interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, an interpretation that, 
for the reasons set forth in the text, entails a presumption of self-execution. 
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are not cognizable in the courts, it is often said that non-self-executing treaties do not 
have the force of domestic law.37 
Although the Court in Foster suggested that it was doing no more than giving effect 
to the intent of the parties to the treaty, the opinion in fact disguises an important 
separation-of-powers holding. The Court's conclusion that the "principle" established 
by the Supremacy Clause is alterable through an affirmative stipulation in the treaty was 
not a necessary one. As noted above, in Great Britain treaties require implementing 
legislation regardless of the treaty's terms or the intent of the parties. In Foster the Court 
could have held that the "different principle" established by the Supremacy Clause is 
similarly unalterable by the parties to the treaty. 38 The Court held instead that the parties 
may alter the rule by entering into a treaty that itself envisions that rights and liabilities 
of individuals will be affected through subsequent acts of dome.stic lawmaking.39 
The Foster holding is easier to describe than to apply. There is little difficulty if the 
parties have specifically considered and come to an agreement on whether the United 
States' obligations are obligations to accomplish certain ends through future acts of 
Congress. But the Court in Foster did not seem to require evidence that the parties had 
addressed the problem at that level of specificity. Instead, the Court inferred such an 
intent from the treaty's use of the future tense40 and oflanguage that the Court construed 
as contemplating the "perform[ance] of a particular act" (i.e., an "act" oflegislation) .4I 
17 See, e.g., j. W. PELTASON, CORWIN AND PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 102-03 (6th ed. 
1973); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 157 (1972); Geoffrey R Watson, The Death of 
Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 781, 831 (1994);Jackson, supra note 2, at 145-46; Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the 
Problnn of &if-Executing Treaties, 45 ASIL PRoc. 66, 68 (1951). Compare Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint 
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (because "the Convention is a self-executing treaty," "no domestic legislation 
is required to give [it] the force of law in the United States") with United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655, 667 (1992) (suggesting that a treaty's self-executing character and its status as "law of the land" are 
separate questions). The contention that a treaty that is not self-executing lacks domestic legal force under-
scores the tension between the doctrine of self-executing treaties and the Supremacy Clause, which declares 
"all" treaties of the United States to be the "Law of the Land." Whether the contention is sound is beyond 
the scope of this article. I address it in a work in progress, tentatively titled Treaties as Law of the Land. 
'" Such an interpretation would have made the Supremacy Clause more efficacious in advancing its purpose 
of averting treaty violations attributable to the United States and would have obviated the doctrinal problems 
that the courts have encountered in drawing the distinction contemplated in Foster, see infra part 11, " 'Intent-
Based' Non-Self-Execution in the Lower Courts," while leaving open the possibility of denyingjudicial enforce-
ment on ·~usticiability" grounds, see infra part ill. As discussed infra note 91, the conclusion that the treaty 
involved in Foster (as there interpreted) was not judicially enforceable could have been framed in ·~usticiability" 
rather than "intent" terms. 
,., Although in 1829 the Court might easily and defensibly have held that the parties lack the power to alter 
the constitutional default rule, such a holding would be difficult to square with subsequently developed 
constitutional doctrine. Under the last-in-time rule, for example, see text at and notes 8-9 supra, a later treaty 
must be enforced by the courts in preference to an earlier conflicting treaty, even if enforcing the later treaty 
would produce a violation of the earlier treaty. If the courts' ability to enforce a treaty may be altered or taken 
away completely by the treaty makers' subsequent agreement with the same or a different nation, it is difficult 
to contend that the courts' ability to enforce a treaty may not be altered or taken away by the treaty makers' 
concurrent agreement with a treaty partner. This point is developed in Vazquez, supra note 37. 
••' Later courts have interpreted Foster as establishing that "words of futurity" indicate that a treaty provision 
is not self-executing. &e Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 
571 (1929). 
•• Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. Although this language from Foster might be read to suggest that the 
distinction the Court had in mind was between treaty provisions establishing obligations to act affirmatively 
and pro\isions establishing obligations not to act, the Foster and Percheman decisions show both the unworkability 
and the irrelevance of such a distinction. The "particular act" that the Court in Foster thought the parties 
had agreed to perform was an act of legislation ratifying and confirming the Spanish grants. The statement that 
a treaty requires legislation when its terms reflect an engagement to perform a particular act thus means only 
that a treaty requires legislation when its terms reflect an engagement to enact legislation. Nor did anything 
in either Fosteror Percheman tum on whether the ultimate objective of the treaty was "affirmative" or "negative." 
It would have been equally plausible to characterize the ultimate objective of the relevant treaty (recognition 
of the validity of the grants) as "affirmative" (i.e., the obligation of everyone [including federal and state 
judges] to recognize the plaintiffs' ownership of the land in question) or "negative" (i.e., the obligation of 
HeinOnline  -- 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 704 1995
704 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 89:695 
But inferring an intent to require legislation in the absence of unambiguous language 
to that effect is a hazardous enterprise, given the multiplicity of national constitutional 
rules regarding the domestic effect of treaties.42 As noted above, for some na1ions treaties 
always require implementing legislation.43 It is thus possible that the language chosen 
by the parties simply reflects the possibility that the treaty will require implementing 
legislation for certain parties no matter what the parties intended.44 Under the Suprem-
acy Clause, however, a treaty can be "self-executing" in the United States even if it is 
"non-self-executing" for other nations by virtue of their constitutions.45 The Court's 
recognition that most nations at the time considered treaties to be non-self-executing 
"by [their] nature" should have led the Court to require more probative evidence that 
the parties had agreed to alter the "different principle" established for the United States 
by the Supremacy Clause. The Court's reversal of its Foster holding in Perclwman, and its 
statement in the latter case that a treaty is self-executing if it "stipulates for [a] future 
legislative act," is probably best u_nderstood as a recognition that the standard applied 
in Foster took inadequate account of the Founders' establishment of a "diffi;:rent princi-
ple" in the United States. Percheman, in other words, should be interpreted to require 
a clear statement-a stipulation-of the parties' intent to alter the principle that, what-
ever the case might be for other states parties, implementing legislation is not required 
to make the treaty cognizable by the courts of the United States. 
''Intent-Based" Non-Self-Execution in the Lower Courts 
Courts and commentators seem to agree that a treaty's self-executing character is 
largely, if not entirely, a matter ofintent. 46 They are divided, however, on three important 
everyone not to interfere with the plaintiffs' quiet enjoyment of the land in question). Yet the Court in neither 
case attempted to draw such a line. Instead, the difference in result was attributable to the diff.erence between 
language suggesting !,he need for legislation ("shall ratifY") and language suggesting no need for legislation 
("shall remain ratified"). In short, what is relevant is not whether the underlying objective of the treaty is an 
affirmative or negative one, but whether the parties agreed to accomplish that objective through intervening 
acts of domestic lawmaking. Thus, even a treaty provision whose ultimate objective is essentially negative (such 
as the obligation not to return a refugee to a place of persecution) would be non-self-executing in the Foster 
sense if the parties to the treaty had stipulated that the prohibition would take effect infraterritorially (i.e., 
would bind domestic-law-applying officials, such as domestic courts) only upon the enactment of domestic 
legislation. See Vazquez, supra note 19, at 56-57 (acknowledging this possibility). 
42 On the diversity of constitutional approaches to domestic enforcement of treaties, see Antonio Cassese, 
Modem Constitutions and International Law, 192 REcUEIL DES COURS 331 (1985 lli); Eric Stein, International Law 
in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization oJCentral-EastemEuropean Constitutions?, 88 AJIL 4·~7 (1994). 
43 See supra text at and notes 11-12. See also Polites v. The Commonwealth, 70 C.L.R. 60 •:1945) (Austl.). 
Justice Iredell stated in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 256, 272 (1796), that the United States Constitution 
"affords the first instance of any government ... saying, treaties should be the supreme law of the land.'' 
44 As discussed below, disentangling a treaty's self-executing or non-self-executing characte:r as a matter of 
U.S. law (which, under Foster, turns on the intent of the parties) from its self-executing or non-self-executing 
character as a matter of the various other parties' domestic constitutional rules is tricky and has proven to be 
a significant source of confusion among the lower courts. 
4
'' This was established as early as 1796, when the Court decided Ware v. Hylton. Because, as Justice Iredell 
recognized, treaties never have domestic effect in Great Britain, there could have been no common intent of 
the parties that the treaty be binding on courts without implementing legislation. The Court held, however, 
that the Supremacy Clause nevertheless made the treaty binding on courts in the United States. 
46 See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama), SA v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.), cert. denid, 113 S.Ct. 411 
(1992); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Cardenas v. Smith, 
733 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Edwards, J., concurring); British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876, 874 (5th Cir. 1979); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F.Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 
963 F.2d 332 (1992). As I show-in part III, however, in many cases "intent" does not do the work that the 
courts claim it does. 
HeinOnline  -- 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 705 1995
1995] THE FOUR DOCfRINES OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 705 
questions: Whose intent counts? What must the relevant persons have intended? And 
how is the intent to be gleaned? 
Foster and Percheman supplied answers to all three questions. The Court in those cases 
sought to determine the intent of the parties to the treaty, as expressed in its text, 
concerning whether they wished to alter the principle that treaties in the United States 
may be enforced by the courts without prior legislative action. Lower courts in recent 
years, however, have sought to discern the intent not of the parties to the treaty, but of 
the U.S. negotiators of the treaty, the President in transmitting it to the Senate for its 
advice and consent, and the Senate in giving its advice and consent.47 Moreover, in their 
efforts to discern such intent, they have gone beyond the treaty's terms, relying instead 
on statements in the negotiating history and statements made during the advice-and-
consent process.48 Finally, a few courts have looked not for an intent to alter the rule 
that treaties do not generally require legislative implementation to be enforceable by 
the courts of this country, but for an intent that the treaty be enforceable in the courts, 
and, in the absence of evidence of such an intent, they have held that the relevant treaty 
is not "self-executing" and thus not enforceable by the courts of this country.49 
The increasing willingness of some courts to go beyond the words of the relevant 
treaty prmision and to rely on negotiating history and statements made during the 
advice-and-consent process in determining whether a treaty is self-executing corresponds 
to a more general shift by the courts in their methodology for interpreting treaty provi-
sions. To the extent the courts look to these sources to discover the intent of the parties 
to the treaty, the shift in methodology is subject to the same criticisms that have been · 
directed at the practice more generally in the context of interpreting treaties, and, more 
generally still, in the context of interpreting legal texts. This change in methodology 
v.ill not be examined further in this article.50 
Whose intent? To the extent the courts have begun to perceive the inquiry not as 
a search for the intent of the parties but, rather, as a search for the unilateral51 intent 
of the President in ratifying the treaty, or of the Senate in giving its advice and con-
sent, or even of lower-level executive officials, the shift warrants further consideration. 
As noted, the Court in Foster and Percheman relied on the treaty's terms, which reflect 
the intent of the parties to the treaty, not just that of the United States. These cases 
establish that the "different principle" established by the Supremacy Clause is one that 
may be altered by the parties to the treaty. The Court did not go so far as to hold that 
the principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause could be altered by the unilateral 
action of the U.S. treaty makers (the President and two-thirds of the Senators), let alone 
17 See, e.g., Frolm•a, 761 F.2d at 376 (relying on preratification statement of President); Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1985) (same}, cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 957 (1986); Posta~ 589 
F 2d at 881-83 (relying on preratification statements of State Department officials and U.S. negotiators); 
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1057 n.4 (D.C. Cir.) (relying on preratification statements by Attorney 
General and State Department Legal Adviser), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851 n.ll 
(relying on State Department's silence); In re Stoffregen, 6 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.) (relying on postratification 
po,ition of U.S. Patent Office and postratification views of Congress), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 569 (1925); Ortman 
v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on postratification statement of Attorney General); 
Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73, 76 (D.C. 1903) (relying on postratification position of U.S. Patent Office). 
See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 n.l9 (1932) (relying on preratification statement of Secretary 
of State and postratification "administrative practice" of the Treasury Department and Coast Guard); Cameron 
Septic Tank Co. v. Knox>ille, 227 U.S. 39, 49 (1913) (relying on apparent views of subsequent Congress). 
''See cases cited supra note 47. 
,., See Posta~ 589 F.2d 862. 
·'• On this question, see, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371-77 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring). 
Sre generaUy DavidJ. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1994); Detlev 
F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading, 4 EuR.J. INT"L L. 472 (1993). 
·,,By "unilateral" I mean not (necessarily) shared (or agreed to) by the other parties to the treaty. 
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by lesser combinations of these officials or their agents involved in negotiating, advising 
or consenting to, or ratifying the treaty. The courts that have looked at the "intent" 
of such officials not just as evidence of the intent of the parties, but as having indepen-
dent significance for the self-execution question, have modified the nature of the self-
execution inquiry in a significant way. 
This modification of the self-execution doctrine is problematic given the apparent 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause. The clause was made applicable to treaties to avert 
conflicts with other nations that could be expected to result from violations of treaties 
attributable to the United States. 52 The Founders sought to achieve this goal by declaring 
all treaties to be "Law of the Land" and thus enforceable in the courts once they became 
binding internationally, without the need for action by an additional body (lthe House). 
The Court's recognition in Foster of a category of treaty that is not enforceable in the 
courts without prior legislative action was somewhat in tension with the purposes of the 
Supremacy Clause because it made the enforcement of some treaties by the courts 
dependent on action by the legislature. If the House failed to agree to the requisite 
legislation, the treaty would be violated and international friction could result. But the 
Foster exception is less problematic from the standpoint of the Supremacy Clause than 
the recent expansion of the exception by some lower courts. If all parties to the treaty 
affirmatively agreed that the ultimate object would be achieved by the Ul!lited States 
through future acts of domestic lawmaking, then any international friction that might 
result from Congress's failure to enact the required legislation could be expected to be 
less severe because the parties were at least on notice that congressional action was 
required. The parties may be said to have "assumed the risk" that Congress might fail 
to carry out its obligations. Although this "assumption of risk" theory would not diminish 
the United States' responsibility to other parties under international law, it might defensi-
bly have been relied on in Foster to support a domestic constitutional rule concerning 
the allocation of enforcement responsibility as between the courts and Congress. But if 
the courts' power to enforce the treaty could be altered through the unilateral action of 
U.S. officials, the resulting international friction would not be tempered in the same 
way. Permitting the "different principle" established in the Supremacy Clause to be 
altered through the linilateral acts of U.S. officials is a greater inroad on the clause's 
purposes, and thus requires an extension of the "intent-based" category of non-self-
executing treaty beyond what was recognized in Foster and Percheman. 
In recent years, the U.S. treaty makers have arguablf3 been purporting to exercise a 
power unilaterally to alter the principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause. Upon 
ratifying recent treaties, they have expressed their intent on the self-execution question 
through "declarations" that the treaties are not self-executing.s.~ These declarations have 
been attached to treaties that would clearly not othenvise be wholly non-self-«!Xecuting. 55 
52 See Vazquez, supra note 2, at ll03. See also 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 694 ("[U]nless [treaties] are 
scrupulously obeyed, and enforced, no foreign nation would consent to negotiate with us; or if it did, any 
want of strict fidelity on our part in the discharge of the treaty stipulations would be visited wilh reprisals, or 
war."). 
53 See infra note 56. 
r.t Such a declaration was attached to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 39/46, Dec. 10, 1984, Hein's No. Kav 2398. The U.S. declaration is 
discussed inS. EXEC. REP. No. 30, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990). A similar declaration was attached to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AJIL 341, 348 (1995). 
55 For example, Article 3 of the Torture Convention prohibits parties from extraditing persons to places in 
which they are likely to be tortured. In the absence of a declaration purporting to place the iss'.Ie beyond the 
courts' cognizance, such a provision would undoubtedly be enforceable by courts entertaining habeas corpus 
petitions of persons subject to extradition orders. See jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and 
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If the intent of the U.S. treaty makers were dispositive of the issue, unilateral statements 
reflecting the views of the President and two-thirds of the Senate that the treaty is not 
self-executing would effectively make the treaty non-self-executing. To give effect to 
such statements would be to recognize that the principle established in the Supremacy 
Clause-the rule that treaties may be enforced in the courts without prior legislative 
implementation-may be altered not only by the parties to the treaty, but by the U.S. 
treaty makers acting unilaterally.56 
The lower courts that have given independent weight to far more ambiguous state-
ments of executive branch officials57 would presumably, a fortiori, give conclusive weight 
to unilateral U.S. declarations of non-self-execution.58 The conformity of this practice 
with the Supremacy Clause, however, has never been considered by the Supreme Court. 
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States apparently approves 
of the practice of giving effect to unilateral statements of U.S. officials to determine 
whether a treaty is self-executing. It reasons as follows: 
In the absence of a special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to decide 
how it will carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the 
United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United 
States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or 
administrative action. If the international agreement is silent as to its self-executing 
character and the intention of the United States is unclear, account must be taken 
of any statement by the President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it 
to the Senate for consent or to the Congress as a whole for approval, and of any 
expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing with the agreement. 59 
But the Restatement's reasoning is faulty: the second quoted sentence does not follow 
from the first. It may be conceded that, as far as international law is concerned, it is 
"for the United States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations," in 
thr Rule of Non-Inquzry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNEll. L. REv. 1198, 1221-26 (1991) (espe-
cially text at and nn.143, 203). Such courts routinely apply treaty provisions that address whether an individual 
b extraditable; upon ratification, Article 3 of the Torture Convention would have become another such 
provision had it not been for the declarations attached to it. There is nothing about the issues that Article 3 
addresses that would have made them non justiciable. The courts in other contexts entertain claims of torture, 
see Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), and make findings of fact regarding a state's propensity to persecute individuals 
in other ·ways, see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Thus, in the absence of the declarations 
attached to the Convention by the United States, Article 3 would undoubtedly have been considered judicially 
enforceable. 
The United States also attached to the Convention a declaration stating that, in this country, the responsibility 
for enforcing Article 3 shall reside exclusively in fue Secretary of State. This provision seems wholly redundant 
in light of the declaration making the entire Convention non-self-executing. It has always been recognized 
that the Secretary has the discretion not to extradite someone whose extradition is othenvise required by 
treaty if there is a danger of mistreatment by the receiving state. See generaUy Semmelman, supra. The non-
self-execution declaration purports to make the Secretary's decision to do so (or not to do so) unreviewable. 
It Is not apparent what, if anything, the additional statement that the Secretary has the "exclusive" power to 
do so accomplishes. 
·,,,It is debatable, however, whether non-self-execution declarations that are formally communicated to the 
other treaty parties and are deposited with the U.S. instruments of ratification can be accurately characterized 
a, representing only the unilateral views of the United States. See the discussion of this issue in Stefan A. 
Ric,enfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Swpe of U.S. Senate Control uver the Conclusion and operation of Treaties, 
67 Cm.-KENT L. Rx:v. 571 (1991), and in Vazquez, supra note 37. 
·,,See cases cited supra note 47. 
·'See Jackson, supra note 2, at 156 ("[T]he courts \viii apparently follow the formally expressed view" of 
the President and Senate concerning a treaty's non-self-executing character.). 
···REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §Ill cmt. h. See also §314 cmt. d ("A treaty ratified or acceded to 
by the United States with a statement of understanding becomes effective in domestic law (§Ill) subject to 
that understanding."); cf. §303 cmt. d (listing condition "that the treaty shall not be self-executing" as example 
of condition Senate might attach to its consent to a treaty that is "presumably not improper"). 
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the absence of an agreement in the treaty itself. This means that U.S. law determines 
whether a treaty will be enforceable in court without prior legislative imp[ementation. 
But, as discussed above, the most pertinent U.S. law on this question is the Supremacy 
Clause. As interpreted in Foster, that clause allocates to the courts the duty to enforce 
treaties just as they enforce the Constitution and federal statutes unless the parties to the 
treaty stipulate othenvise. The question on the table is whether the clause also permits 
U.S. officials, acting without the consent of the other parties, to declare treaty provisions 
to be judicially unenforceable. In answering this question, the notion that "it is for the 
United States to determine how to carry out its international obligations" i.s unhelpful, 
as we are interpreting the provision of the U.S. Constitution by which the Framers 
determined how the United States would carry out its international treaty obligations.60 
Whether the Supremacy Clause permits U.S. officials, acting unilaterally, to alter the 
"different principle" established by that clause, and, if so, which official:; and under 
what circumstances, are questions beyond the scope of this article. I note, however, that 
the conformity of this practice 'vith the Supremacy Clause has gone largely unexamined 
by the courts, that the Restatements defense of the practice is unpersuasive, and that, for 
the reasons set forth above, the practice is in some tension 'vith the text and apparent 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause.61 
Intent about what? Some lower courts not only have shifted the focus from the intent 
of the parties to the unilateral intent of U.S. officials; they also have shifted the focus 
of what it is that the relevant people must have formulated an intent about. Rather than 
looking for evidence of an affirmative intent to alter the principle that tro::!aties in the 
United States do not require legislative implementation to be enforceable in the courts 
as law, they have looked for evidence of.an intent to make these treaties enforceable in 
the courts as law. They have reversed the presumption recognized by the Court in Foster 
and Percheman so that, in the absence of any evidence of an intent on the part of these 
officials, a treaty is non-self-executing and thus not enforceable in the courts without 
prior legislative implementation. 62 
w Nor does the truism that the greater power includes the lesser lend support to the notion that the treaty 
makers have the power unilaterally to make a treaty judicially unenforceable. The power not to enter into a 
treaty at all does not include the power to enter into a treaty but make it judicially unenforceable. If the 
purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to avert treaty violations by making treaties, once ratifio:d and binding 
on the United States, enforceable in the courts, the Founders may well have preferred no treaty at all to a 
. treaty that bound the nation internationally but was not judicially enforceable. Cf. 2 MA.x FARRAND, Tm: 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 393 (rev. ed. 1966) (Gouverneur Morris was "not solicitous 
to multiply and fucilitate Treaties .... The more difficulty in making treaties, the more valm~ will be set on 
them."). 
61 There is both judicial and scholarly authority that calls into question the constitutionality or effectiveness 
of the non-self-executing declarations that have been attached by the United States to recent treaties. See 
Henkin, supra note 54, at 346-48, 349;John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Po.'.itical Rights and 
the Supremo.cy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1287 (1993);JordanJ. Paust, Avoiding Fraudulent Executive Policy: Analysis 
of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1257 (1993); Riesenfcld & 
Abbott, supra note 56; Charles H. Dearborn III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions 
Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REv. 233 (1979); Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 
538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remo.nded with instructions to dismiss as 17UJOt sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. 
Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957). 
I examine this question in Vazquez, supra note 37, and find merit in two arguments favoring the constitution-
ality and effectiveness of these declarations: (1) the declarations are not "unilateral," but represent an 
agreement among the parties to the treaty and thus fall within the rule set forth in Foster (cJ. supra note 56); 
and (2) if the U.S. treaty makers possess the constitutional power to abrogate a treaty for purposes of domestic 
law, even when such abrogation is not permitted by international law, they must also possess the constitutional 
power to enter into a treaty but unilaterally deny it domestic legal force. 
62 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979). See also cases cited supra note 30 and infra note 67. 
Additionally, in recent litigation the executive branch has taken the position that there is a pr·~sumption that 
treaties are not self-executing, relying (directly or indirectly) on Foster. See supra note 30. For a more extended 
critique of this position, see Vazquez, supra note 19, at 44-53. See also REsTATEMENT (TIIlRD), supra note 30, 
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Where the presumption is placed assumes enormous significance in this context. 
Perhaps because of the diversity of domestic-law rules on the subject, nations negotiating 
treaties rarely address matters of domestic implementation. 53 The constitutional default 
mle will therefore ultimately determine the judicial enforceability of the vast majority 
of treaties. To adopt a presumption against self-execution would thus be to make most 
treaties non-self-executing and thus judicially unenforceable without legislative imple-
mentation. 
A presumption of non-self-execution is difficult to square with the text of the Suprem-
acy Clause. Such a presumption would establish as the general rule in the United States 
that treaties are not binding on the courts; they would be so binding only if the parties 
affirmatively stipulated that they were not subject to legislative implementation. To be 
sure, this interpretation would not deprive the Supremacy Clause of all effect: since, 
under the British rule, treaties lacked domestic legal force even if the parties wanted 
them to have such force, the Supremacy Clause, so interpreted, would at least have had 
the effect of giving the treaty makers the power to give domestic legal force to the treaties 
they made. This modification of the prior rule would not have been trivial, but the 
Supremacy Clause's terms do not easily bear a "power-conferring" construction. Article 
II gives the President (with the Senate's consent) the power to make treaties; the Suprem-
acy Clause purports to make treaties, once made, binding on the courts. The courts that 
have suggested that treaties are judicially enforceable only if they were intended to be 
judicially enforceable have thus transformed the self-execution inquiry in a manner that 
seems fundamentally incompatible with the text of the Constitution. 
Even courts that have not gone so far as to adopt a presumption of non-self-execution 
have nevertheless failed in their decisions to take adequate account of the fact that the 
contemplated effect of the Supremacy Clause was to reverse the British rule. For example, 
courts have considered whether treaties that include provisions phrased in the following 
terms are judicially enforceable before legislation is enacted: "Every country party to 
this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures 
necessary to insure the application of this Convention." The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit found that this language signified that the treaty was not considered 
by the parties to be self-executing.64 There are several things wrong with this conclusion. 
First, it is well accepted that some provisions of a treaty may be self-executing while 
others are not. 65 Thus, even if the quoted provision suggested that some implementing 
legislation would be required, it is possible that the contemplated legislation relates only 
to some provisions of the treaty, not to all. Second, as discussed above, in some countries 
implementing legislation is always required, and other countries may require it in circum-
stances in which it would not be required in the United States. Therefore, the quoted 
provision may merely reflect the fact that implementing legislation may be required in 
!:i Ill reporters' note 5 (criticizing Postal); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. 
v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AJIL 892 (1980) (same). 
'''See Iwasa'l'.'a, supra note 1, at 654 ("Whether or not a treaty provision will be self-executing for a particular 
'tate party ... ha[s] generally not been [a] consideration when states enter into treaty obligations."); Paust, 
supra note 1, at 770-71 (the parties to a treaty "rarely concern themselves with the details of domestic 
implementation"). 
"'Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). Other lower courts have 
rched on provisions such as these, or provisions that are even less probative of a "stipulation for a future 
legislative act," to support their conclusion that a particular treaty is not self-executing. See Posta~ 589 F.2d at 
876; Tel-Oren v. Lib)'an Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring); Linder v. 
Calero Portocarrero, 747 F.Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F.Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985), affd on other grounds, 
R09 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
,,·,See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §111 cmt. h. 
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some countries because of their domestic constitutional rules. Our domestic constitu-
tional rule (the Supremacy Clause) dispenses with the need for implementing legislation 
unless the parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers) reversed the ordinary rule by 
"stipulat[ing] for some future legislative act." The quoted treaty provision tells us that 
parties must enact the domestic measures that are "necessary" to ensure the application 
of the Convention; it does not make legislation "necessary" if it otherwise would not 
be. For this reason, such provisions should not be considered "stipulations for a future 
legislative act" that render a treaty non-self-executing under Foster.66 
Courts and commentators in recent years have variously described the "intent" that is 
relevant to the self-execution inquiry as an intent to create "private rights," or ·~udicially 
enforceable" "private rights" or "private rights of action," or as an intent that the 
provision be ·~udicially enforceable at the behest of individuals."67 These fc)rmulations 
raise several concerns. First, insofar as they suggest that the absence of an intent to make 
the treaty judicially enforceable means that the treaty is not judicially enforceable, they 
invert the presumption established by the Supremacy Clause. Second, the fc)rmulations 
misleadingly suggest that the treaty's judicial enforceability is always a matter of intent; 
as shown in part III below, a treaty may be judicially unenforceable for reasons other 
than intent. Finally, the references to "rights" or "rights of action" or enforceability 
"by individuals" suggest a conflation of the judicial enforceability vel non of the treaty 
with the question of who has standing to enforce the treaty in court and what remedies 
are available to such persons. Ali discussed in part V, these issues are analytically distinct. 68 
Even if a treaty does not confer a remedy, an othenvise justiciable treaty obligation is, 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, enforceable in court at the behest of individuals, 
either defensively by persons who have standing or offensively by persons who have a 
right of action. If a right of action is not conferred by other state or federal laws, the 
availability of judicial relief may depend on the treaty makers' intent to create a private 
right of action. 69 But, as explained in part V, the judicial enforceability vel non of a treaty 
does not depend on anyone's intent to create a "right of action."70 
III. THE 'juSTiciABILITY'' DocrRINE 
Foster established a relatively circumscribed exception to the general rule that treaties 
may be enforced as law by the courts \vithout prior legislative implementation. The Court 
recognized that this general rule was alterable by the parties to the treaty through an 
affirmative stipulation in the treaty itself. Ali discussed, this principle has been expanded 
by some courts to recognize a unilateral affirmative stipulation by the U.S. trt:aty makers, 
66 See Vazquez, supra note 19, at 58-59; Paust, supra note 1, at 775 n.97. 
67 See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama), S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) ("intent to provide 
a private right of action" or to provide "a privately enforceable cause of action"); United States v. Davis, 767 
F.2d 1025, 1030 n.9 (2d Cir. 1985) (intent to confer '1udicially enforceable rights on individulls"); Tel-Oren, 
726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, ]., concurring) ("inten[t] to be judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals" 
and "inten[t] to give individuals the right to enforce [the treaty] in municipal court"); United States v. 
Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("inten[t] to impart on an individual the right to bring a legal 
action to force compliance with the treaty"). 
r.'The standing issue is discussed infra note 134 and in Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1133-41. The closely 
related right-of-action issue is discussed in part V infra, and in Vazquez, supra, at 1141-57. 
69 But cf. Vazquez, .supra note 2, at 1157-61 (arguing that a right of action should be held to be implicit in 
a treaty in certain circumstances even if there is no evidence that the parties [or the treaty maken] affirmatively 
intended to create a right of action). 
70 The similar statement that a tr··aty is enforceable at the behest of individuals only if it creates a "private 
right," see, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979); Dreyfus 
v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), is either wrong (if "right" is understood as a synonym for "right 
of action") or a tautology (if "right" is understood more broadly as the obverse of a legal duty). 
HeinOnline  -- 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 711 1995
1995] THE FOUR DOCTRINES OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 711 
and some courts have looked beyond the words of the treaty to find such a stipulation. 
Some courts have even reversed the presumption and have looked not for an intent to 
require legislation, but for an intent to dispense with legislation. Even with the foregoing 
variations, the focus of the "self-execution" inquiry remains on finding evidence of an 
intent regarding whether the treaty may be enforced in court without prior legislative 
implementation. 
Some lower courts in recent years, however, have perceived the inquiry not as a search 
for evidence of an intent regarding whether the ultimate object of the treaty was to be 
accomplished through future acts of legislation. Instead, they have viewed a treaty's self-
executing or non-self-executing nature as a characteristic that exists independently of 
any intent to require legislation. They have perceived this characteristic as a part of the 
treaty's essence, to be discerned by the court using whatever guidance it finds useful. 
Although these courts continue to consider the intent of the parties and the U.S. treaty 
makers relevant, they do not limit their search to ascertaining such intent. The precise 
nature of their inquiry remains in many respects obscure, but it is evident that these 
courts have a conception of the self-executing/non-self-executing dichotomy that differs 
from that reflected in the Foster and Percheman decisions, as interpreted above. 
A review of the decisions that ascribe independent significance to factors other than 
intent shows that these courts have examined under the "self-execution" rubric various 
concepts that are not unique to treaties. These include matters su<:h as whether the 
claim is justiciable, whether the litigant has standing, and whether the litigant has a 
right of action. Rather than examine these issues separately as they (generally) do in 
constitutional and statutory cases, courts confronted with treaties have rolled all of these 
issues into a single "self-execution" question. 
The decision in Frolova v. USSR71 illustrates this approach. The court there enumer-
ated the following factors as relevant to whether the treaty was "intended to be self-
executing": 
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances 
surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the 
agreement; ( 4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mecha-
nisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the 
capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.72 
Although the court said that the ultimate issue was whether the treaty was "intended" 
to be self-executing, the list of factors shows that the "intent" the court had in mind 
was a purely constructive intent (which is to say, not intent at all). The court did not 
search for an actual intent or even infer an intent; it imputed an intent based on the 
factors listed. The factors address reasons, unrelated to intent, why the treaty obligation 
should perhaps not be judicially enforceable; they relate to whether the obligation is a 
justiciable one or whether the plaintiff has a right of action. These are distinct issues 
that, outside the treaty context, are examined by the courts separately. In treaty cases, 
however, as Frolova shows, these issues are all thought to be part of a single "self-
execution" inquiry. 
This section examines some of the factors other than intent that some courts have 
considered in determining whether particular treaties are self-executing, and thus judi-
cially enforceable without additional legislation by Congress. This discussion will show 
that the self-executing/non-self-executing distinction has come to serve the functions 
'
1 Frolo\'3 v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985). 
7
' /d. at 373. 
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that are served in the statutory and constitutional contexts by the concepts of justiciability 
and "political question." 
Precatoriness and Non-Self-Execution 
like other laws, treaties are enforceable in the courts only if they impose obligations. 
Some treaties do not impose obligations but, instead, set forth aspirations. The courts 
have found that such treaties are not judicially enforceable, and in the process they have 
described these treaties as "non-self-executing."73 That "precatory" treaties are not 
judicially enforceable is neither surprising nor troubling. The role of the courts in our 
governmental system is to enforce the rights ofindividuals.74 If a treaty doe:; not impose 
an obligation on the defendant to treat the plaintiff in a given way, it does not give the 
plaintiff a correlative right to be so treated. Litigants arguing that the treaty entitles 
them to such treatment should therefore lose on the merits. That "precatory" provisions 
are not judicially enforceable does not distinguish treaties from statutory or constitutional 
provisions. 75 
Of course, the line that separates "precatory" provisions from provisions that impose 
"obligations" may not always be bright. Where the line is drawn is a matter of domestic 
law that effectively allocates enforcement power (and responsibility) between the courts 
and the legislature. In the context of federal statutes addressed to state governments, a 
body of case law has arisen to distinguish "obligatory" provisions enfow:::able by the 
courts from "precatory" provisions whose "enforcement" is allocated to the other 
branches of the federal government.76 With respect· to treaties, the self-executing/non-
self-executing distinction has been equated by some courts with the obligatory /precatory 
distinction and has similarly served to allocate enforcement responsibility between the 
courts and the political branches. 
Recognition of this category of non-self-executing treaty expands the notion of a ''non-
self-executing" treaty beyond what was recognized in Foster and Percheman. "Precatory" 
treaty provisions are deemed judicially unenforceable not because of the parties' (or 
anyone's) intent, but because what the parties agreed to do is considered, in our system 
of separated powers, a "political" task not for the courts to perform.77 The parties' 
73 In INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429 n.22 (1984), the Court in dictum described Article 34 of the Refugee 
Convention as "precatory and not self-executing." See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republi<', 726 F.2d 774, 
809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("Articles 1 and 2 [of the United Nations Charter] •.. contain 
general 'purposes and principles,' some of which state mere aspirations and none of which can sensibly be 
thought to have been intended to be judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals."); Sci Fujii v. State, 
242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2 (CaL 1952) (UN Charter provision requiring states to "promot[c] and cncourag[c] 
respect for human rights" not self-executing); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9,Jaffe v. Snow 
(U.S. May 27, 1994) (No. 93-241) (arguing that an agreement between the United States and Canada "to 
cooperate to deter ... transborder abductions" is judicially unenforceable), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2724 (1994). 
74 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
75 For example, in Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a statute 
cannot be enforced through 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1988) if, rather than "creat[ing] an obligation," it "does no 
more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment." 
76 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The line in this context has not 
been a stable one; the most recent decisions appear to rely primarily on the presence or absence of congres-
sional intent to make the provision judicially enforceable. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 3•17 (1992). Such a 
standard, if adopted for treaties as well, would effectively collapse the intent-based non-self-execution category 
and the justiciability category. Depending on which presumption is adopted ( cJ. part II, " 'Intent-Based' Non-
Self-Execution in the Lower Courts,'' supra), this would either drastically expand or drastically reduce the 
judicial enforceability of treaties. 
77 Although the Foster and Percheman Courts did not require evidence that the parties had specifically 
considered whether an act of Congress was required, the question, as the Court conceived it in Foster, was 
whether such an intent could be inferred from the language of the treaty. There was nothing about the 
provision's ultimate objective (recognition of the validity of Spanish grants) that made it inherently judicially 
unenforceable; the provision was judicially unenforceable only because the parties to the treaty contemplated 
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intent determines what the United States' obligation is (e.g., to "use its best efforts" to 
accomplish certain objectives), but the conclusion that the provision is not judicially 
enforceable results from notions about the appropriate role of courts in our domestic 
system. 
Though this category of judicially unenforceable treaty differs in kind from the cate-
gory recognized in Foster, its existence is constitutionally defensible-indeed, necessary. 
The Supremacy Clause allocates treaty-enforcement powers to the courts, but the power 
to enforce the law of the land was constitutionally allocated to the courts only in "cases 
of a Judiciary nature.'m Complying with an obligation to "use our best efforts" or to 
"cooperate" to accomplish certain ends, or to "promote" or "encourage" them, re-
quires the consideration and balancing of numerous disparate demands on our resources 
to determine what the "best" we can do under the circumstances is. The conclusion 
that, in our system of separated powers, this determination is not for the judiciary to 
make is so intuitive as to make the propriety of this category of judicially unenforceable 
treaty seem self-evident.79 It is nonetheless important to recognize that such treaties are 
judicially unenforceable not because of the intent of the parties (or anyone), but for 
domestic separation-of-powers reasons. Where the line is drawn between "precatory" 
(hence judicially unenforceable) and "obligatory" (hence judicially enforceable) treaty 
provisions is a matter of domestic constitutional law. 
The unique hybrid domestic/international nature of treaty norms poses special chal-
lenges to courts attempting to draw that line. Treaty obligations might be thought by 
some to be "precatory" as a general matter because effective international enforcement 
mechanisms are lacking. The Founders, however, were well aware of the deficiencies of 
the international enforcement mechanisms;80 yet, by declaring treaties to be laws, they 
made them enforceable in our domestic courts so as to avert treaty violations attributable 
to the United States. The Supremacy Clause thus reflects a constitutional commitment 
by the United States to take its treaty obligations seriously notwithstanding their arguably 
precatory character in the international arena. In drawing the domestic-law line between 
precatory and obligatory treaty provisions, therefore, courts in this country should take 
care not to be unduly influenced by the modem realist tendency to regard treaties 
generally (like other forms of international law) as imperfectly obligatory. Courts should 
be aware that the line they draw between precatory and obligatory treaty provisions is 
purely one of domestic law, and in drawing that line they should keep in mind the 
Founders' intention, in adopting the Supremacy Clause, to transform what would other-
wise have been imperfectly obligatory norms into judicially enforceable "laws.'' 
lndetenninateness and Non-Self-Execution 
The category of non-self-executing treaty that includes precatory and hortatory provi-
sions may be expanded to encompass provisions that have been held to be unenforceable 
because they do not set forth sufficiently determinate standards for evaluating the con-
duct of the parties and their attendant rights and liabilities. This variant of the self-
that the objective would be achieved through legislation. Indeed, the very same treaty provision was held in 
Pn-dmnan, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), to be judicially enforceable without legislative implementation. "Preca-
tory" provisions, by contrast, are judicially unenforceable without regard to the parties' intent concerning 
judicial enforcement. 
7
' Set' 2 E\RRAND, supra note 60, at 430. See also 3 STORY, supra note 12, at 695 (Supremacy Clause directs 
courts to "enforce [treaties] directly in all cases, to which they can be judicially applied"). See generaUy Vazquez, 
supra note 2. at 1129-30. 
,., Cj Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978). 
"'See Vazquez, supra note 2. at 1097-1101, 1124-25. 
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execution issue originated in dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in Head Money 
Cases, where the Court said that a treaty may be judicially enforced by private individuals 
when it "prescribes a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or sul~ect may be 
determined."8 I Today, it is reflected in lower-court decisions that have asked, in the 
course of determining whether a given treaty is self-executing, whether the treaty is "too 
vague for judicial enforcement,"82 or "provide[s] specific standards,"83 or is "phrased 
in broad generalities"84 or "language of a broad and general nature."85 The same idea 
seems to underlie the Restatement's assertion that a treaty is self-executing :tf it "can be 
readily given effect ... without further legislation."86 
These questions are not unique to treaties. The lack of ·~udicially discoverable and 
manageable standards" is often cited as bearing on whether statutory or CC)nstitutional 
provisions are judicially enforceable.87 This question is usually examined a:; part of the 
"political question" doctrine, but some commentators have argued that a court that 
declines to enforce a legal provision on political question grounds, like a court that 
declines to enforce a "precatory" law, is simply deciding on the merits that the law does 
not impose an obligation on the defendant or confer a correlative right on the plaintiff.88 
Again, the conclusion that the treaty does not create "obligations" or "rights" disguises 
normative judgments about the role of the judiciary in our governmental s~stem.89 In a 
81 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). Some cour!s have read !his language to stand for !he 
proposition !hat a treaty may be enforced in !he cour!s by individuals only if it establishes "private rights." 
This formulation of !he "self-execution" test, however, is at best tautological and at worst misleading. See supra 
note 70.lfihe term "right" were understood in a particulanvay-i.e., as !he obverse of a duty that is sufficiently 
determinate to be judicially enforced-Ihen !he "private right" interpretation and !he "determinateness" 
interpretation offered in !he text would be collapsed, but !he concept of a "right" would do no work: !he 
treaty's enforceability would tum on !he precision wiih which !he duty was defined; !hat !he treaty conferred 
a "right" would simply follow from !he conclusion !hat it was judicially enforceable. However, because there 
are innumerable competing senses of !he term "right," see HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, TilE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN TilE MAKING AND APPUCATION OF LAW 135 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & 
PhillipP. Frickey eds., 1994) (!he term is "incorrigibly multifarious in actual usage"), I prefer, in tlte interest 
of clarity, to frame !he "self-execution" test(s) wiihoutrecourse to !he term. CJ. in.fratextatnote 89 (conclusion 
!hat treaty confers a "right" reflec!s judgmen!s about !he role of !he cour!s in our governmental system). 
Wl People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9Ih Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
1003 (1975). 
83 Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In American Baptist Churche.; v. Meese, 712 
F.Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989), !he court said !hat Article 1 of !he 1949 Geneva Convendon Relative to 
!he Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 'vas not a self-executing treaty provision because "(t]he 
language used does not impose any speeijicobligations on tlte signatory nations" (emphasis added). The court 
said !hat tlte lack of precision deprived tlte court of "any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement." 
See also Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749, 767 (D. Haw. 1990) (citing lack of "standards and 
procedures to judicially enforce !he treaty"), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9Ih Cir. 1991). 
84 Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7Ih Cir. 1985). The C•)Urt concluded 
!hat such language "suggested !hat [tlte articles of tlte treaty] are declarations of principles, not a code of 
legal righ!s." 
85 United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
86 REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3,0, §Ill reporters' note 5. A provision that prohibi!s clearly defined 
conduct on tlte part of tlte United States is perhaps !he clearest example of a provision !hat "can readily be 
given effect" wiihout furiher legislation. See Commonwealih v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, '702-03 (1878), 
described by tlte Supreme Court as a "very able" decision, United States·v. Rauscher, 119 US. 407, 427-28 
(1886). See also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §Ill reporters' note 5; Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1127. Cf. 
Vazquez, supra note 19 (describing [and criticizing] executive branch argumen!s !hat Article 33 of !he Refugee 
Convention, which tlte United States agreed to comply witlt when it adhered to tlte Refugee Protocol, is not 
self-executing even tltough it prohibi!s clearly defined conduct). Even a treaty provision whose object is to 
prohibit clearly defined conduct would be non-self-executing if !he parties so intended. See S11pra note 41. 
87 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (constitutional norms); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 
493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (constitutional and statutory norms judicially enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 if 
"not ... 'too vague and amorphous' " (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Au !h., 479 U.S. 418, 431 
(1987))). 
&• See Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Q]lestion Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976). 
"'J .See supra note 81. 
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sense, even "precatory" or "vague" treaty provisions impose obligations (and confer 
correlative rights): the obligation to attempt in good faith to bring about the contem-
plated ends and to act in conformity with even vague standards. Like the line between 
"precatory" and "obligatory" provisions, the line between "vague" and "manageable" 
standards is a domestic constitutional one that serves to allocate powers between the 
courts and the legislature and reflects judgments about the proper role of the courts in 
our governmental system. 
That some such line must be drawn is certain. The Framers' constructive limitation 
of the judicial power to enforce laws to "cases of a Judiciary nature"90 contemplates a 
distinction between justiciable and non justiciable controversies. The vagueness of a treaty 
provision is surely relevant to its direct judicial enforceability, just as the vagueness of a 
constitutional or statutory provision is. A treaty provision setting forth a vague standard 
often leaves the parties with considerable discretion concerning the manner of bringing 
about the desired objective. If so, it might properly be concluded that, in our system of 
separated powers, determining how to achieve the desired objective is more appropriately 
a task for the legislative branch. 91 But there may be imprecise treaty provisions that the 
judicial branch is well suited to enforce directly. For example, the "vagueness" of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution is not thought to render 
them judicially unenforceable. Thus, although relevant, the vagueness of a treaty provi-
sion is not necessarily dispositive of its direct judicial enforceability. 
Non-Self-Execution as Free-Wheeling Abstention 
Some lower courts have treated the self-execution inquiry as a more free-wheeling 
inquiry into the treaty's judicial enforceability,92 taking into account numerous factors 
in addition to precatoriness and indeterminateness. In People of Saipan, for example, 
the court listed the following factors as relevant to determining whether a treaty "estab-
lishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legisla-
tion": "the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence 
of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the 
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and 
long-range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution. " 93 This variant of the 
self-execution question thus appears to ask the courts to engage in an open-ended 
inquiry to determine on a case-by-case basis whether judicial enforcement of a particu-
lar treaty is a good idea. The test seems to resemble the ad hoc, quasi-discretionary 
abstention doctrine that some consider the political question doctrine to be.94 Like 
this understanding of the political question doctrine, this version of the self-execution 
'"' See supra note 78 . 
. ,, Indeed, the Foster decision might have been decided on such grounds. As interpreted by the Court in 
that case, the relevant treaty provision obligated the United States to begin recognizing the Spanish grants as 
valid at some unspecified future date. As an alternative basis for its conclusion that the treaty was not judicially 
enforceable without legislative implementation, the Court might have said that the determination of the 
relevant time to begin recognizing the grants as valid requires the exercise of "political" judgment that, in 
our tradition, is not for the courts to make. If this had been the basis of the Court's judgment, a different 
result would have been called for if the treaty had stipulated that the United States "shall ratify the Spanish 
grants by January 1, 1824." 
"
2 People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974). Other courts have 
asked whether the treaty creates ·~udicially enforceable" or "privately enforceable" rights or rights of action 
or causes of action. See, e.g., Frolo\'ll v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 270 (1991), and cases cited 
supra note 67. These tests seem to combine the ·~usticiability" question (which I discuss in this part) and the 
pri\'ate-right-Qf-action question (which I discuss in part V infra). 
'" 502 F.2d at 97. 
''
1 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAS!" DANGEROUS BRANCH 125-26, 184 (1962). 
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doctrine can be criticized as incompatible with our society's conceptions about what 
it means for a norm to have the status of "law," and, in particular, about the judiciary's 
role in enforcing norms having such status.95 But there are additional reasons to be 
troubled by these courts' apparent conception of the self-execution doctrine as an ad 
hoc, quasi-discretionary abstention doctrine. 
Perhaps because the courts are cognizant of the tension between the political question 
doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, that doctrine has been restricted to relatively narrow 
limits. Only in exceptional cases is the doctrine even invoked, and it succeeds in only a 
fraction of those. The Supreme Court's decisions strongly suggest that the self-execution 
question is similarly relevant only in exceptional cases. The Court has unambiguously 
denied relief on self-execution grounds in only one case,96 as an alternative holding,97 
and it reversed that decision only four years later.98 In countless cases, the vast majority 
of those raising treaty-based claims, the Court has resolved the case without even men-
tioning the self-execution issue.99 Nevertheless, the lower courts in recent years have 
treated self-execution as a threshold issue to be addressed in every treaty case. Asking 
the courts to determine as a threshold matter on an ad hoc basis in every treaty case 
whether the treaty should be judicially enforceable threatens to expand the doctrine 
"to new and uncharted fields." 100 
A review of the lower-court self-execution decisions confirms the danger that courts 
applying this variant of the doctrine will lose sight of the Founders' design. As noted 
y:; See Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1959). 
""I refer here to Foster. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913), the only other case in 
which the Court may have denied relief on self-execution grounds, was ambiguous in this regard. In INS v. 
Stevie, 467·U.S. 407 (1984), the Court stated in dictum that Article 34 of the Refugee Convention was not 
self-executing. In the other cases in which the"Court has mentioned the issue, the Court has either (1) found 
the treaty to be self-executing, see Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 248, 252 (1984); 
Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932); Asakura v. City 
of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); United States v. Forty-Three 
Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 188 (1876), or (2) denied relief on the basis of the last-in-time rule, see 
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
97 See supra note 35. 
98 Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
!J'J See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 336 U.S. 187 (1961); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Fac1or v. Lauben-
heimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Nielsen v.Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929);Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); 
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 181 U.S. 619 (1901); Florida v. Furman, 
180 U.S. 402 (1901); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
457 (1891); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889); Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886); Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83 (1867); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 
737 (1866); Crews v. Burcham, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 352 (1861); Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457 (1859); 
United Statesv. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); Porterfield v. Clark, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 76 (1844); Holmes 
v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); Strother v. Lucas, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 763 (1838); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.} 181 (1825); Hughes''· Edwards, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Chirac v. Chine, 15 U.S. (2 
Wheat.) 259 (1817); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300 (1816); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
There are, of course, possible alternative explanations for the infrequency with which the Supreme Court 
has addressed the self-execution question. In some of the cases cited above, the litigant relyin~; on the treaty 
lost on other grounds, and there was accordingly no need to reach that issue. Moreover, by denying certiorari 
in cases in which the lower courts have dismissed on self-execution grounds, the Court may be tadtly approving 
the results, if not the reasoning, of those decisions. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court has not addressed 
the doctrine in many years despite the glaring need for clarification, but has instead gone out of its way to 
avoid reaching forcefully pressed self-execution arguments by dismissing treaty-based claims on other (exceed-
ingly tenuous and controversial) grounds, see, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), is itself strong evidence of the doctrine's problematic 
status. 
11
"' The Court used this phrase in rejecting a conception of the act of state doctrine as a vague, quasi-
discretionary abstention doctrine requiring an open-ended, case-by-case inquiry similar to that required by 
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above, the Founders envisioned a central role for the courts in the enforcement of 
federal laws (including treaties). Because the courts are frequently called upon to enforce 
the Constitution and federal statutes, they are comfortable with their constitutional role 
in enforcing these categories oflaws and accordingly have narrowly restricted the political 
question doctrine. But because the lower courts are less accustomed to enforcing treaties 
and tend to regard foreign relations questions as the province of the other branches, 
they have typically been exceedingly timid in enforcing treaties, particularly when individ-
uals have sought to enforce them against the executive branch of the federal Govem-
ment.1"1 A doctrine that effectively asks the courts to decide on a treaty-by-treaty basis 
whether treaties should be ·~udicially enforceable" and provides little guidance on the 
question is thus likely to result in a far more restricted judicial role than the Constitution 
contemplates. 
What is needed is the articulation of a constitutional standard to differentiate the 
types 1 "~ of treaty provisions that are "addressed" as a constitutional matter to the legisla-
ture from those that are judicially enforceable without legislative elaboration. It will 
likely be impossible to arrive at a broadly applicable formulation that does not leave a 
great deal to incremental judicial development. Factors other than "precatoriness" and 
"vagueness" will no doubt be relevant.103 It may even be that certain treaties are not 
judicially enforceable under our Constitution because they bear too closely on national 
security or are otherwise too sensitive for judicial involvement. A claim that an arms 
control agreement requires the United States to dismantle weapons, for example, might 
be non justiciable on this ground even if the agreement is neither precatory nor vague. 
These are questions for another day. Giving content to the distinction between judicially 
enforceable and judicially unenforceable treaty obligations will take time, but the project 
cannot meaningfully begin until we clearly distinguish the ·~usticiability" from the "in-
tent-based" branch of the self-execution doctrine and recognize that what is called for 
in the ·~usticiability" cases is a constitutional separation-of-powers decision analogous 
to a political question decision. In the meantime, perhaps the most we can expect is 
that the courts use an appropriate baseline in making their ·~usticiability" decisions: 
taking due account of the central role that the Constitution assigns them in the enforce-
the \1eW of the self-execution docuine discussed in text. W.S. Kirkpauick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics 
Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). 
1
"
1 Lower..:ourt decisions in the three lawsuits seeking to enjoin the Haitian interdiction program as a 
violation of the Refugee Protocol illustrate this timidity. In both Haitian Refugee Centerv. Gracey, 600 F.Supp. 
1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985), and Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, No. 92-CV-1258, slip op. at 8 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 5), rev'd on other grounds, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
II3 S.Ct. 2549 (1993), the disuict court denied relief on the ground that the Refugee.Protocol was not self-
executing, and in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 
( 1992), the court of appeals denied relief on the same ground. It is noteworthy that, when the Supreme Court 
finally confronted the challenge to the interdiction program, it did not question the Protocol's judicial 
enforceability, even though the Executive forcefully urged the Court to hold that the Protocol was not self-
executing. Sale, supra. On the self-executing character of the Refugee Protocol, see generaiiy Vazquez, supra 
note 19. 
1
"" An important difference between this category of non-self-executing treaty and the Foster category is that 
a justiciability-based determination that a treaty is judicially unenforceable will affect not just the particular 
treaty provision before the court, but all provisions "like" it. Determining that a treaty is not judicially 
enforceable for reasons other than intent requires a constitutional separation-of-powers judgment; a determina-
tion that one treaty provision is not judiciaiJy enforceable will accordingly affect ali relevantly similar treaty 
provisions. By contrast, the parties to the treaty (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers unilaterally) may make a 
treaty judicially unenforceable for any (rational) reason; their determination that one treaty shall not be 
judicially enforceable \\ill not have any necessary implications with respect to the judicial enforceability of 
other treaties. 
1
"' If some "vague" treaty pro\isions may be suitable for direct judicial enforcement while others are not, 
~f<' ~upra text follo\\ing note 91, distinctions among such provisions will obviously have to be based on factors 
other than vagueness. 
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ment of treaties, they should hold treaty provisions to be judicially unenforceable only 
if there are exceptional and compelling reasons for doing so. 
IV. THE "CoNSTITUTIONALITY'' DocrRINE 
It is often said that a treaty is not self-executing if it purports to accomplish what is 
within the exclusive lawmaking power of Congress. Although there is no "definitive" 
judicial authority for this proposition, 104 the proposition is unproblemadc from the 
standpoint of the Supremacy Clause. It is well accepted, for example, that the treaty-
making power is subject to the Bill of Rights. 105 Thus, a treaty that purports to restrict 
the freedom of speech in a way that would not be consistent with the First Amendment 
if the restriction had been enacted by Congress would not be enforceable i.n the courts 
for the same reason that an unconstitutional statute would not be. There is little difficulty 
in concluding that a treaty that purports to accomplish what lies beyond the treaty-
making power for other reasons is similarly not enforceable in the courts. 
If Congress possesses the power to accomplish what the treaty makers agreed to do 
but lack the power to accomplish, then the treaty might be thought of as "non-self-
executing." Compliance by the United States with the treaty is not impossible, but the 
Constitution requires an act of Congress. 106 But this category of non-self-executing treaty 
differs significantly from the categories discussed above. It differs from the Foster category 
in that the treaty's non-self-executing character does not depend on the intent of the 
parties or the treaty makers (or anyone). Instead, the treaty is non-self-executing because 
of the treaty makers' constitutional disability. The "constitutionality" version of the 
doctrine is similar to the '1usticiability" version in that both require judgments about 
constitutional allocations of powers, but the '1usticiability" version require:; a judgment 
about the distribution of the power to enforce particular types of treaty provisions 
between the courts and the legislature, while the "constitutionality" version requires a 
judgment about the distribution of the power to accomplish certain ends between the 
treaty makers and the lawmakers. 
The dearth of case law on the "constitutionality" version of the doctrine indicates 
that this category is of limited practical significance. The types of treaties that have been 
considered non-self-executing for constitutional reasons include treaties that purport to 
raise revenue, 107 treaties that purport to make conduct criminal, 108 and treaties that 
purport to appropriate money. 109 Whether these conclusions are sound, and whether 
there are other powers that the lawmakers possess but the treaty makers lack, are beyond 
the scope of this article. 
Courts sometimes consider the subject matter of a treaty to be relevant to the self-
execution issue even though there is no question about the treaty makers' constitutional 
power to accomplish the contemplated objective. Thus, it is often said that treaties of 
1114 &e REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §Ill reporters' note 6. 
105 &e HENKIN, supra note 37, at 137-56, 251-70. 
106 &e Paust, supra note 1, at 775-81; HENRY]. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOII, INTERNA· 
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 556-57 (4th ed. 1994). 
107 &e REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §Ill cmt. i; Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925). But see Paust, supra note 1, at 71'8, 780-81. 
108 REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §111 cmt. i; Iwasawa, supra note 1, at 676 n.239; Hopson v. Krebs, 
622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Treaty regulations that penalize individuals ... are generally considered 
to require domestic legislation before they are given any effect."). But see Paust, supra note 1, at 775, 780. In 
The Over the Top, 5 F.2d at 845, the court said that "[i]t is not the function of treaties r.o enact the ••• 
criminal law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is self-executing." 
109 &e REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §Ill cmt. i. But see Paust, supra note 1, at 775, 778, 780-81. 
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friendship, commerce and navigation are self-executing;110 it has also been said that 
extradition treaties are by their nature self-executing111 and, inconsistently, that they are 
non-self-executing. II2 Under the analysis proposed in this article, the relevance of a 
treaty's subject matter to its self-executing character will vary depending on which self-
execution doctrine is involved. Subject matter would appear to be irrelevant under Foster. 
Indeed, the very treaty found to be non-self-executing in Foster'vas later held to be self-
executing. What matters under Foster is the presence or absence of an intent to require 
legislation. Subject matter should generally also be irrelevant under the broader 'justicia-
bility" version of the doctrine. This version of the doctrine holds a treaty to be non-self-
executing if the obligation the treaty imposes is one that is not amenable to enforcement 
by the courts. In the prototypical case, the focus will be on the nature of the provision 
(precatory versus obligatory; vague versus determinate), not the substantive topic to 
which the provision relates. It may be, however, that the sensitivity of a treaty's subject 
matter can render it non justiciable in certain circumstances. 113 With this possible excep-
tion, the subject matter of a treaty, as distinguished from the nature of the obligation, 
should be relevant to the self-execution issue only to the extent the Constitution places 
that subject beyond the scope of the treaty-making power. 
V. THE "PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION" DOCTRINE 
Increasingly in recent years, the "self-execution" question has been said by the courts 
to concern whether the treaty being invoked confers a "private right of action." 114 It 
may be conceded that private parties may maintain an action in court to enforce a 
treaty provision only if they possess a right of action. It is a mistake, however, to assume 
that a treaty may be enforced in court by private parties only if it confers a private 
right of action itself. Many treaties, like most constitutional provisions and many federal 
statutes, do not themselves purport to confer private rights of action. Instead, they 
typically impose primary obligations on individuals (including government officials) 
without expressly addressing matters of enforcement. m A treaty that does not itself 
address private enforcement is no less judicially enforceable by individuals than consti-
11
" Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353, 356 (1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982). See 
Alona E. Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT"L L. 178, 186 (1953) (listing 
12 subjects normally considered to be self-executing, including "unconditional most-favoured-nation provisions 
of commercial treaties"). -
111 See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("E.xtradition treaties by their 
nature are deemed self-executing and thus are enforceable without the aid of implementing legislation."), 
affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (1991}, rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 655 
(1992); In re Extradition of McMullen, 769 F.Supp. 1278, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
"" Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) ("Treaties of extradition are executory in their character, 
and fall Y.ithin the rule laid down by Chief justice Marshall in Fosterv. Neilson ... " (dictum)). 
11 1 See text folloY.ing note 103 supra. 
111 See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6817, at *11 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 17, 1995); Telesat de Panama v. United States Dept. of Defense, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18469, at *17 (Fed. 
Cir. Aug. 7, 1992); Goldstar (Panama), SA v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Columbia Marine Servs., Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 
21 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976); United 
State.; v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749, 767 (D. 
Haw, 1990); Handel v. Artuko\ic, 601 F.Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985). Cj Argentine Republicv. Amerada 
Heo;s Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-42 ( 1989) (citing Foster and Head Money Cases in support of proposition 
that certain treaties do not confer private causes of action). 
,-. Se~ PAtiL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL S)'STEM 533 
(3d ed, 1988) ("Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature .... [Often,] substantive rights [are] defined 
by Congress but the remedies for their enforcement left undefined or relegated wholly to the states."). 
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tutional or statutory provisions that do not themselves address private enforcement. 
The "private right of action" to enforce a treaty may have its source in laws other than 
the treaty itself. 116 
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, all treaties that are self-executing in the first three 
senses of the term operate to nullify inconsistent state laws and prior federal laws. Thus, 
even without a "private right of action," private individuals may enforce such treaties 
defensively if they are being sued or prosecuted under statutes that are inconsistent with 
treaty provisions. 117 Additionally, treaties may be supplemented by the common law118 
and by state statutes that confer "rights of action." 119 Thus, if an individual's liberty or 
property has been taken in a manner that contravenes a treaty provision, that individual 
may enforce the treaty in court through common-law forms of action or statutory provi-
sions that authorize lawsuits to challenge deprivations of such liberty or property inter-
ests. Because the Supremacy Clause prohibits the states from discriminating against 
federal law, 120 such common-law or statutory rights of action must be made available by 
the states to redress deprivations that violate treaties if they are available to redress similar 
deprivations that violate state law. Finally, rights of action to enforce treaty provisions may 
be supplied by federal statutes.121 For e~ample, extradition treaties are typically enforced 
through habeas corpus petitions. 122 Additionally, federal statutes such as section 1983 
and the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) confer rights of action to enforce federal 
laws (including treaties) against state and federal officials, respectively.123 
The judicial opinion most often cited for the proposition that a treaty is "self-execut-
ing" and hence judicially enforceable only if it creates a private right of action 124 came 
in a case in which there was no apparent source outside the treaty for the plaintiffs 
right of action. In Tel-Oren v. LilTyan Arab Republic, private parties sued to recover damages 
for injuries allegedly caused in Israel by the terrorist acts of the defendants.125 Having 
concluded that the Alien Tort Statute did not confer a right of action, Judge Bork, in 
his concurring opinion, considered whether a right of action could be Jound in the 
treaties invoked by the plaintiffs. If the attack had occurred in the United States, the 
court could probably have found a right of action in state tort law. 126 If th1~ lawsuit had 
116 In other words, a treaty that does not itself create a private right of action might be d1:scribed as non-
self-executing in the sense that a plaintiff seeking to maintain an action must find some other law to supplement 
the treaty, see infra note 134, but the "other law" need not be federal, or statutory, or later in time than the 
treaty. 
117 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 336 U.S. 187, 197 (1961); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145 (1914). 
IIH Throughout our nation's existence, treaties have been enforced in court through common-law forms of 
action, such as actions in debt and actions in the nature of ejectment. Florida v. Furman, 1!!0 U.S. 402, 428 
(1901) (action to remove cloud on legal title); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 243 (18119) (ejectment); 
Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453, 462-63 (1819) (bill in equity); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 
259, 277 (1817) (ejectment); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300, 303 (1816) (same). 
119 Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 125 (1928) (state mandamus action); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 
332,340 (1924) (state action for injunction); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,485 (1879) (action "pursu-
ant to a law of the State"). 120 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (federal habeas corpus action); Baldwin v. Franks, 
120 U.S. 678 (1887) (civil rights legislation). See generaUy Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1146-54 (discussing 
availability of §1983 and Administrative Procedure Act as rights of action for enforcing treat{ obligations), 
l2'l See, e.g., Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
12.' See generally Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1143-56. 
124 Though there were cases before Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)1 that 
equated the self-execution issue and the private-right-of-action issue, see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congolcum 
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), Tel-Oren 
apgears to have become the standard citation for this equivalency. See cases cited supra now 114. 
25 726 F.2d at 775. 126 Because the attack occurred in Israel, it was unlikely that any state's tort law applied to such conduct. 
The question of federal jurisdiction would of course have been a separate issue. 
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been brought in state court, the court could have considered whether Israeli law con-
ferred a right of action. 127 But because the lawsuit was brought in federal court and 
federal jurisdiction was premised on the "arising under" statute, a federal right of action 
was necessary. 12s Since the defendants were not state or federal officials, neither section 
1983 nor the APA conferred a right of action, and (in light of Judge Bork's interpretation 
of the Alien Tort Statute) no other federal statute gave the plaintiffs a federal right of 
action for damages. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for the court to 
consider whether the treaty itself conferred a private right of action. 129 
Unfortunately, however, Judge Bork created much confusion by equating the "right of 
action" issue with the "self-execution" issue, and by erroneously writing that, "[a]bsent 
authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty's 
provisions only when the treaty ... expressly or impliedly provides a private right of 
action." 1:m Subsequent courts have relied on this dictum in cases in which there should 
have been no occasion to ask whether the litigant relying on the treaty had a "right of 
action." For example, in the recent criminal prosecution of Manuel Noriega, the district 
court stated that certain treaties Noriega was relying on would be "self-executing" and 
thus enforceable by the court only if they created a "private right of action." 131 Defen-
dants relying on a treaty as a defense to a criminal prosecution (or claiming that the 
treaty governs the conditions of their confinement) do not need a "private right of 
action," as they are not seeking to maintain an action.132 
This is not the place to discuss what criteria should determine whether a treaty confers 
a right of action. 133 It is important to note, however, that this issue is analytically distinct 
from the "self-execution" concept introduced in Foster and even from the broadened 
·~usticiability" version of the doctrine derived from Head Money Cases. 134 Given the 
existence of common-law and statutory rights of action for the enforcement of federal 
m However, a state court might have dismissed such a suit on the ground ofJarum non conveniens, an issue 
that would be governed by state law. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S.Ct. 981 (1994). 
12
' That would certainly be true today under the Supreme Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §1331 in 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Thus, the court's statement in Columbia 
Marine Sen·s., Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988), that "[a]n action arises under a treaty [for 
purposes of §1331] only when the treaty expressly or by implication provides for a private right of action" 
wa. accurate when made, though it might have been contestable before MerreU Dow. 
I.!'• Other courts that have considered whether a treaty confers a private right of action have similarly done 
so in circumstances in which there was no other apparent source for the judicial remedy sought by the plaintiff. 
Set Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (suit for damages for injuries occurring in 
Yugoslavia). 
;"'Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808. Even if we interpreted the term "authorizing legislation" broadly to include 
state statutes and generic federal statutes such as the habeas corpus statutes, this statement would be erroneous 
because it fails to recognize that a right of action to enforce a treaty may have sources other than legislation; 
it may, for example, have its source in the common law or in another treaty. 
111 United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The court held that the treaties were 
self-executing. 
11
" The court in United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985), similarly discussed 
whether the treaty gave a criminal defendant a right of action. If a prisoner after conviction wishes to challenge 
the conditions of his confinement on the ground that they violate the U.S. treaty obligations, the habeas 
co;p,us statutes confer the relevant "right of action." 
1 
'On this question, see Vazquez, supra not,e 2, at 1155-62. 
1 
'
1 The Resmtement takes the position that " [ w] hether a treaty is self-executing is a question distinct from 
whether the treaty creates private rights or remedies." REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, §Ill cmt. h. In 
reality, a treaty that does not itself confer a private right of action can accurately be described as non-self-
executing, as that term is used in legal discourse. See Vazquez, supra note 2, at 1117-18 (citing such uses of 
the term). As I have argued elsewhere, the variety of ways in which the term can be used contributes to the 
confusion surrounding the self-execution "doctrine." See id. If, however, the Restatement means that the distinc-
tion introduced in Foster did not relate to the existence or nonexistence of a private right of action, it is 
correct. 
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laws, whether a treaty itself confers a "private right of action" is a question that should 
have to be faced in only a subset of treaty cases.135 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties has particularly 
confounded the lower courts, whose decisions on the issue have produced a body of law 
that can only be described as being in a state of disarray. Much of the problem is the 
result of sloppy reasoning and careless use of precedent. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
recently dismissed a treaty argument out of hand with a simple citation to a Supreme 
Court footnote stating that a different provision of the treaty was not "self-eJ~:ecuting." 136 
(As noted, 137 it is well accepted that certain provisions of a treaty may be self-executing 
while others are not.) But even the courts that have been somewhat more conscientious 
in attempting to classify treaties according to Chief Justice Marshall's distinction have 
been confounded by the unusual hybrid domestic/international nature of the distinc-
tion. Unfortunately, they have had little guidance from the Supreme Court, which has 
not said more than a sentence or two about the distinction in any case for nearly a 
century. 
The confusion is ultimately attributable to the expansion by some lower courts of 
Chief Justice Marshall's distinction to embrace related, though distinct, is~.ues that are 
not unique to treaties. Addressing distinct issues through a single "doctrine" has inevita-
bly, and predictably, resulted in disarray. For example, decisions correctly dismissing 
claims on the ground that the treaty on which the plaintiff relied did not create a 
private right of action, and in the process labeling the treaty as non-self-executing, have 
subsequently been relied on, erroneously, to reject the arguments of a litigant relying 
on the treaty by way of defense.138 And '1usticiability" decisions stating dmt a treaty's 
self-executing character is a matter for the courts to decide independent:ly (a correct 
statement if confined to this version of the self-execution issue) will be erroneously relied 
on for the proposition that the intent of U.S. officials regarding judicial enforceability 
is not dispositive of, or even relevant to, the self-execution issue. 139 
Bringing coherence and analytical clarity to this area of the law requires recognition 
that the self-execution "doctrine" addresses at least four distinct types of n~asons why a 
treaty might be judicially unenforceable. First, a treaty might be judicially unenforceable 
because the parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers unilaterally) mad(: it judicially 
unenforceable. This is primarily a matter of intent. Second, a treaty might be judicially 
unenforceable because· the obligation it imposes is of a type that, under our system of 
135 The issue of standing ~r "invocability" of a treaty provision has often been examined as a self-execution 
issue. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 158-59. The standing issue is closely related to the right-of-action issue. To 
the extent we continue to regard standing as a self-execution issue, we may regard it as a branch of the "private 
right of action" version of that doctrine. As I have addressed standing to enforce treaties at length elsewhere, 
see Vazquez, supra note 2, I shall not discuss it here except to note that, at a minimum, anyone whose common-
law liberty or property interests are being impaired through a violation of a treaty should be deemed to have 
standing to enforce the treaty in court. See generally id. For example, someone kidnapped lrom Mexico by 
federal officials and being held in the United States necessarily has standing to enforce in our courts a treaty 
provision prohibiting such abductions and requiring the return of the abductee, if the treaty is self-executing. 
CJ. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992), quoted supra note 25. 
136 See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 751 (1991). 
137 See text at note 65 supra. 
138 See United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Fla. 1992), and United States v. Bent-8antana, 
774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985), discussed supra in text at and notes 131 and 132. 
139 See Report of the Committee on Human IUghts, Annex D, Committee Letter to Senator Claibame Pell (Dec. 11, 
1991),AM. BRANCHINT'LL. Ass'N, PRoc. & COMMITTEE REP.1991-1992, at 98, 111 & n.26, 11!~ & n.28 (1992), 
quoted in Paust, supra note 61, at 1265-66. 
HeinOnline  -- 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 723 1995
1995] TI-lE FOUR DOCfRINES OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES 723 
separated powers, cannot be enforced directly by the courts. This branch of the doctrine 
calls for a judgment concerning the allocation of treaty-enforcement power as between 
the courts and the legislature. Third, a treaty might be judicially unenforceable because 
the treaty makers lack the constitutional power to accomplish by treaty what they pur-
ported to accomplish. This branch of the doctrine calls for a judgment about the alloca-
tion of legislative power between the treaty makers and the lawmakers. Finally, a treaty 
provision might be judicially unenforceable because it does not establish a private right 
of action and there is no other legal basis for the remedy being sought by the party 
relying on the treaty. Unlike the first three categories of non-self-executing treaties, a 
treaty that is non-self-executing in the fourth sense will be judicially unenforceable only 
in certain contexts. These four issues are sufficiently distinct and require sufficiently 
differing analyses that they should be thought of as four distinct doctrines.140 
If integrity is to be restored to this area of the law, the courts must recognize that the 
terms "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" do not have a unique meaning with 
respect to treaties. In examining "self-execution" arguments, the courts should therefore 
carefully consider the precise reason that the particular treaties before them are claimed 
to be judicially unenforceable, and in deciding the issue they should rely only on prece-
dents involving that issue. Finally, and most importantly, the courts should decide the 
issue in full cognizance of the central role that the Constitution assigns to them in the 
enforcement of treaties. 
11
" We might add to the list of "doctrines" of self-executing treaties by including categories for treaties that 
fail to accomplish certain other things that a litigant might need in particular circumstances to maintain an 
action. For example, to sue a government entity, a litigant may require a waiver or withdrawal of sovereign 
immunity. A treaty that does not waive or withdraw such immunity might be described as "non-self-executing." 
&e Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989). 
